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' I 
THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT 
AND 
_ITS ROLE IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY 
An Abstract 
The Third Man Argu1tent, which made its f1?st 
recorded app~arance in the philosophy of ancient Greece, 
has most often been thought of as an attack upon Plato's 
Theory of Forms. Plato• s theory, cf course, s.cc.ommodated 
two types of 'man's the Form and the particular. The 
Form was that which two or more particular men were sa1d 
to be 11ke one another '1n virtue of.' Plato had sought 
to restore the notion of stability 1n a world of appar-
ent flux. Forms were unchanging, perfect, and indepen-
dent. Particulars were changl~..g, imperfect, and dependent 
upon the Forms for their being. The Third Man A:rgU!!lent 
(actually there are three vers1ons--two pointing out a 
'third .man• 1n addition to the Form and particular, and 
one yielding not only a •~mr.£ man,' but s.n 1ndef1nlte 
number) attempts to show a flaw in Plato's Theory of Forms. 
What is indeed strange 1s the fact that Plato presents 
the argume!lt himself 1n his dla.logue the Pe.rmenide~ and 
seem1n~ly leaves it unanswered. This has led commentators 
to a host of interpretations, prcnou..~c1ng the argument 
11 
either valid or invalid, f1nd1ng 1 ts role in Plat6 •,s . 
development either signifi ca nt or 1ne1gn1ficant. 
It is .the purpose of this study to analyze the 
various versions of the Third Man Argument, to examine 
commentaries on them, to judge the validity of the argu-
ments and · their significance to Plato's philosophy. It 
is my f1nd1ng that Plato was certainly aware of the argu-
ment he was presenting--that he was actually using it to 
purge his followers of false notions of his theory arising, 
apparently, from taking his metaphorical language too 
literally. That he was aware of the difficulty of 
finding the right words, 1s seen, I think, 1n his dia-
logue Cratylus, It is my contention, however, that Plato 
knew the argument was valid (although not against his 
actual theory) and goes on in -the Parmenides to set his 
followers stra1ght--present1ng a dialectical exercise 
(far from being a 'joke' as some have supposed) showing 
the necessity of certain combinations of' Forms and 
indirectly implying that the Third Man Argument~ be 
answered. Further it 1s possible that Plato had attempted 
to forestall a 'third man' as early as the Re-ou.bl1c (with 
the now-famous Third Bed Argument). And with more 
technical terminology of recent times (lli R. E. Allen), 
identifying Forms as 'exemplary causes' and particulars 
11 
as •relational entities,• I think that Plato's theory 
can be understood in such a way to hinder the entrance 
of any 'third man.' But ~he role that the Third Man 
Argument plays 1n Plato's philosophy 1s not so much a 
step 1n h1s development as 1t 1s a step to forestall 
others from developing h1s theory into something it was 
never intended to be. 
111 
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I 
APPROACH TO AND BACKGROUND OF THE THIRD MAN 
The Approach . 
Getting to the crux of the so-called 'Third Man 
· Argument' and 1ts role 1n Plato's philosophy is similar 
to attempting to traverse Zeno of Elea's Line of Dicho-
tomy, which tor my own purposes I choose tc mop out 1n 
a stadium,l before one can even get to center-stage one 
must first cover half the distance, Emd before reaching 
the half, half of the half, and before half of .the half, 
half of the half of the half, and so on into 1nf1n1ty 
without ever reaching one's destination. Deap1te many 
difficulties, !t 1s the purpose of this paper to examine 
the Third Man Argument--1ts various versions (especially 
t~e one found 1n Plato's Parmen1de~), what it is a1med 
against, whether or not it 1s valid, ~nether or not Plato 
thought it was, whether or not Plato g1ves an answer, 
and, finally·, the use Plato made of it. 2 
Much has been written on the subjec t yet ~ontroversy 
remains, and. will remain, no doubt, after .my thesis. I 
am by no means presenting~ def1n1t1vs work on the 
Third Man. I am, however, br1ng1ng toge t her a great 
bulk of the material already written and p: e, ent1ng a 
2 
.e_ossible interpretation of my ·own~-hop1ng that the 
response that 1t brings will either reinforce it or 
completely demolish it. Too much- has been said on the 
Third Man without sufficient explanation or rebuttals 
I bring some ot these views to light. 
It 1s my contention that although the •Third Man' 
attempts various ways of entering into Plato•s Theory 
ot Forms to disrupt it, all attempts ra11. It ls, 
nonetheless, important, I think, in that it serves as 
an example of what happens when one takes Plato's theory 
(as presented 1n the Republic and the Phaedo) too 
literally and adds to it ones own contamination w1th 
appearances. Language being but an imperfect copy 
together with man's inability to completely escape 
appeare.noes is representative of the human predicament, 
bound in the cave of appearances, knowing, perhaps, that 
reality lies outside, but having little ability to find 
1t--and even if one does, the inability to express 1t. 
Sheer ignorance or the fear of the unknown may lead some 
to postulate a 'third man,' hoping to make appearances 
s~fe as the only reality. The argument works, however, 
only as long as appearances creep int Plato's theory or 
reality 1s not accurately presente~ in the argument end 
therefore the argument 1s not valid against what 1t 
proposes to be against. Plato's doctrine, far from 
J 
being simple, 1s complex, and the Third Man Argument, 
no matter what sect or1g1nated it, 1s used by Plato as 
a diuretic for his students--to purge them from an 
over-s1mpl1fied view of his theory, to show them where 
problems of language and appearance might lead. 
Background 
. , .. The Third Man Argument made 1 ts first recorded 
appearance 1n ancient Greece and 1s most often thought 
of as an attack upon Plato's Theory of Forms. Plato's 
theory , states that what we experience are only _ resem-
blances of what really 1s3--that particuiar men, for 
exampl~, 'participate' 1n some Form Man,4 Form Man 
being that man, most real, which two or more men are 
like .each other or said to be man 'in virtue or.,5 The 
world ~f Forms is the real world, the absolute, the . 
world of our senses 1s only the world of shadows, the 
r~lative. The Forms are unchanging and perfect, serv-
1~g as . the causes of things and as the criteria for 
6 knowl6dge. We recognise particular th1ngs by recol-
lect1n~ the Forms a.nd we are able to judge these pa:r-
tlculars 1n l.ight o-r the trui:, Forms. As part1cular~en 
w~ only approximate the real, unique Form Mani we are 
m~re r~semb1ances. 
The Third Man Argument (or at least the main version 
of 1t) attacks this point of rese!!l.bla.nee and the notion 
or some 'unique• Form over a group of many particulars. 
Forms appear as being separate from particulars, yet it 
1s . tfhat these -particulars hold 1n common. But suppose 
you go a step further, · do both the Form ~n and the 
particular men have the characteristic 'man'? If the 
answer 1s affirmative, you are on the road to uniting 
the particular man (Man I) along with the Form Man (Man 
II) with some additional Form Man (Man III) coming over 
--and above the other two. This road leads not only to 
some 'third man• but to an 1nf1n1te number of men (Forms 
'Man' which denies Plato's thesis that each Form is 
unique, that 1s, there 1s just~ Form Man,~ Form 
Bed, etc.7 If the Third Man Argument is in fact logically 
valid, 1f it is against what Plato actually held, and if 
Plato has not managed an escape route, it just might be 
possible that his metaphysics, epistemology, ant ethics 
are in for serious trouble. What is sur prising is this, 
Plato himself 1mpl1es another version of this argument 
a:id directly presents the one given above in the Parmen-
~. One would think after becoming familiar with the 
w1de range -of commentaries on the Parmen1des and the 
numerous different reasons for the 'third. man' appearing 
th~rein, that Plato wrote his dialogues so that anything 
could be deducea ble from his texts. Actually, I find, . 
that Plato is not perfectly clear, and if one does not 
go beyond appearances, one might well concl,ld .e that his 
5 
philosophy 1s ful1 of contradict1ona. Does Plato think 
that the 'third man• 1s an intruder to be dealt w1th and 
1f so, for what reason? Is the a~gument valid and 1s 
Plato forced to revise or abolish h1s theory? Does 
the second part of' the Parmenides actually bring an 
answer to the Thl .:rd Man--or is that part of the dialogue 
Qnly a joke? Does Plato still speak of the Forms . in 
his later dialogues 1n the same way as in earlier ones? 
. These questions an d many more hsve been met with con-
trary answers by Plato scholars. But before taking on 
this 'third man' and his role in Plato's thought, it 
1s important to note that there are at least two other 
versions of the Third Man Argument. 
Varieties of the Third Man Argument 
' As 1f the problem of regress in the TMA isn't 
enough. there weIDS t~ other Third Man Arguments going 
around about the . •time of the one mentioned--both desiring 
to add some 'th1m man• to man the particular and man 
the Form--but this time without any regress. Now, exactly 
1fhF.lt these argume nt s are and what they are &gains~ . seems 
like something which needs considering, and to proceed 
in a secure and or,derly path it might be well to give 
all three Third Man Argn,'I:ents. Alexander of Aphrod1s1as 
recorded thie thr e,e various arguments in his commentary , 
8 
on Aristotle's M~taE hl.§.1£!! (~. a, 990b 15). The 
6 
third version 1s expressed ln .two parts and although 
· Alexander presents the first part by wa1 of introduction 
to his comments, I shall reserve it ., ror after the second 
version of the argument. 
One· Th1 rd Man 
· This first Third Man is ascribed to the Megar1an 
logicians (sophists) generall11 Alexander states it, 
I:f' we say 'there is a man walking' we do 
not mean that Man, in the sense of t ·he Form 
is walk1ng--ror the Form is unmoving--nor yet 
a determinate particular man--and how can we 
mean this if we do not recognise the man? We 
. are aware that a man is walking, but not who · 
.. , . the particular man is of whom we asswert this 1 · 
we are saying that another third man different 
from these 1s walking. Ergo, there is a third 
man of whom we have predicated that he 1s ___ _ 
walking. To be sure, this argument 1s sophis-
tical but an opening 1s ,made for it by those 
who postulate the Forms.~ 
This argument has been commonly interpreted as being based 
on the ambiguity resulting from - lack of an indefinite 
article (there being none in Greek). Such commentators 
as A. E. Taylor and Francis M. Cornford 10 hold this 
v1e,r, and simply by looking at the argument, their _ tnt _er-
pretation seems quite plausible. 
I might say, for example, that a man 1s walking by 
the Philosophy Department door. Now, plainly I do not 
mean that the Form Man 1s walking by because, accord~ng 
to flato, Forms do not move and are not capable of being 
snatched ( this ma..l'l is moving and I might very well snatch 
him up and pull him into the offiee--a good catch if 
indeed he be the Form-~ph1losop h1p-si 11 rewarding!), 
- V 
7 
surely, too, if the man keeps walking and escapes down 
the steps and out the door, I would not in tears cry 
outa "Oh, dear, there goes Humanity:" But still it 
remains that I do not know who the man iss he is no 
specific fellow that I know. So if he is not some 
specific particular or the unique Form, what or who is 
he? The answer seems to bes he is some unspecified 
particular. If I were to obtain namss of every man 
well perserved enough to walk and place them all in a 
disjunctive proposition ("Either Chairman Freeman _ walked 
by or Dr. Young walked by or Dr. Martin walked by or 
Dr. _ Peterson walked by or • • then I mean that 
some one of this set has just walked ~oy--but exactly 
which I do not lmow. The man, then, is a particular, 
partaking of the Form Man and surely not something over 
and above the Form. There 1s no infinite regress .and 
if ,. taken this way poses no threat to Plato' a Theory of 
Forms. As Taylor concludes, "• •• it is merely a 
correct reflection on the ambiguity of the article 
such as would naturally occur to anyone interested in 
the . formal development of logic." 11 
, If, however, one says s1rnply "man walks" instead of 
"a man 1s wal kin&" 'man' in th1s case w1 thout the articl e 
8 
as the Greek would allow, then something queer does 
happen. Haro,ld Chernisa contends -that this 1s how the 
argument 1s meant to be taken since why else would a 
Megarian group come up with 1t and why else would an 
1ndef1n1te subject be called a 'third man'? Cherniss 
supposes that the argument points to Plato's Theory of 
Forms and. its inability to account for common pred.1cates. 
He says that the subject 1s not some particular man but 
rather 1t 1s not ~ particular man. The man who walks 
b7 the Philosophy Department door 1s not a Form and not 
a l)Brrt1culars he is Just a man. To say that man walks 
suggests a common predicate 'man•--certa1nly neither 
For~ nor part1cular--but a 'third man'1 hence, as 
Che~niss would have it, we would have three types .of 
•man• 1 Man the Form, ma.'1 the part1oular, and man the 
common predicate. When we say "man walks" we sre 
speaking of men 1n g~n.erai.1 2 The Form is not 'men 1n 
general' fer Plato, certa1nlY1 it 1s what 1s most truly 
real, a substance, and we a!e only relational ent1t1es 13 
having a sort of adject1vsl existence. R. E. Allen, 
who\also holds this latter view, finds that the fsilure 
to Jccount for common predicates 1s not so much en over-
on Plato's part but rather the consequence of his 
In fact, Allen contends ths.t Plsto's Forms 
are actually the causes of particulars, exemplary _causes. 
\ 
All statements or the rorm "• •• is F" are either 
statements of 1dent1 ty or Nlationa~ s_tatements •14 
the case of the latter, "• •• 1s F" 1s to be inter-
preted as "F 1-s the cause of ••• 1115 A variet7 of 
different Forms cause us to be the way we are, as we 
are, 1n. this world of Becoming. Ontologically there 
1s no need ~or common predicates, and with no such 
predicates no ·third IIU:ln can ar1se. 
9 
In 
Jus :t b~eause we use a subJeot-pred1cate sentence 
structure 1s no reason to believe that reality must 
correspond aceoTCl1ngly. In the Cratzlus Plato shows 
that language 1s not perfect, like everything else 1n 
this world o~ flux 1t 1s only an approximation (per-
h~ps,even bett~r, a distortion) of the truly real. 
Language, un~ortunate.Jy, got off to a bad sta.r ·t;, Those 
who initiated 1t were spinning about so very mu.ch that 
their creation lacked the stability needed~ Names and 
verbs were orten m1sg1ven without much thought. 16 To 
create a closer approximation to the ideal Language at 
this point would be futile and so Plato 1s left to work 
with the . subject-predicate structure. Predicates as we 
know them (to affirm as a quality or attribute of some-
thing) are out of place 1n Plato's philosophy (what we 
cal1 ~qualit~es• or 'attributes• are really substance 
and not something predicated of it). Look, for e.xample, 
10 
at Plat :o•s discussion of the virtues 1n the Protagoras 
(which, . by the way, was written prior to the Pha.edo 
where Plato argues extensively for the Forms, prior 
to the Parmenides where he seems to argue so strongly 
against them, and far earlier than the~!..~ where 
most commentators think the combining of Forms appears 
for the f'i:.r-s t . time). At JJlB Plato says "Justice is 
pious" and at 330D "Piety is justlfs he says "Wisdom is 
Courage• at .350C and "Courage 1s Wisdom" at J61B. Now 
surely Justice 1s not the same Form as Piety, and Wisdom 
is not the ·s.ame Form as Courage, What is meant can, 
I think, be e%pla.1ned in this we.ya Piety causes Justice 
and Justice causes Piety I Courage cause -s Wisdom s.nd 
Wisdom ca.uses Courage. Courage is one of those things 
needed to make (cause) Wisdom to be what it is. It is 
neither •1aentical. to• nor •an attribute or.• •cause,• 
however, does~ appear here in the exemplary sense as 
Allen shows the Forms to be of the sensible worlds 17 1t 
1s a neeessary cause--Courage 1s part of the essence of 
Wisdom. I do not think that J. A. Ackrlll 1s entirely 
incorrect 1n pointing out n2n-~ymmetrical relationships 
1n the world of Forms. I agree with him that Justice 
1s a species of virtue, whereas Virtue is not a species 
of Justiee--o ne c learly comes under the other, however, 
I am saying t his t Wisdom, Courage, Justtce, and 
11 .. 
Temperance may all be v1~i;uss-- ,enter1ng into what Virtue 
1s--but then again V1rtue -combines ·with each of the others 
to make the others what they are. 18 The same holds true 
·ror "man walks", the Form Man certainly does not walk--
Walk 1s .. not an attribute of the Form Man, 1t 1s part of 
its essence, 19 Plato would likely take this as another 
example of the ability of certain Forms to combine. 
The Form Man combines with the Form Walk, whereas, it 
does not combine with the Form Fly (the Form Bird would 
comb1ne.-w1th the Form Fly). Since this community of 
Forms is necessary, 1t 1s possible for resemblances of 
the Form Man to partake not only of that Form but also 
the Form Walk. In our common everyday language we might 
say "It 1s the nature of men to walk, say, rather than 
fly." That 1s to say, in Plato's language, that the 
Form Man does not combine with the Form Fly but that 1t 
does with the Form Walkt th1s means that the Form Man 
and Form Walk are necessarily combined. The Form Man 
causes likenesses of itself and these likenesses are 
capable 'of walking' by being capable of being caused 
also by the Form Walk. That this compatibility exists 
i .n the World of Forms, allows 1 t to exist • analogously 
so in the world of senses. 
So getting back to this first version of the Third 
Man Argument, no harm can come to Plato's Theory of 
12 
Forms. If you remove the ambiguity by saying"! man is 
walking, but I know not ·which" this 'third man' 1s simply 
some unspecified particular. It 1s your fault for not 
knowing who he is--not Plato's. · If, -however, you take 
· the argument with the ambiguous "man walks" the 'third 
man• 1s nothing at all. Either "man walks" 1s showing 
the communion of Forms or analogously the part1c1pat1on 
of particul ars (please note from the prior discussion 
of the above that participation in the Form World works 
both ways between Forms and hence . 1s called •combining•, 
'participation' in the world of sense 1s a one-way 
relnt1on--the Forms cause us, we do not cause them, or 
we are resemt tlances of the Forms, they do not rese mble 
us). Th& 'man' 1n "man walks" is not some third in-
truder; nothing comes in between the Forms and particular 
nor over an~ above the Form. 
Another Third Man 
This Third Man 1s attributed to the Megarian con-
temporary of Plato, Polyxenus, by Phanias ln a letter 
to Diodorus •. Alexander quotes from that correspo ndence 
Polyxenus• argument, 
: If . man ls man in virt ue of partaking e.11d 
partici pa tio n i n th e Form or au~ oav~pwno½, 
there .must be a man who has hi s betn g re lat iv el y 
to the Form. But neithe r the au.:-oa. \l-opw1to½ who 
1s the Form, nor the ~4r ticul ar man, 1s 1n 
virtue of par t i c i pa t io n in th e For m. T""e re-
mainin g possibility i s th at the.re shoul i be a 
·third man who has being relative to the 
Form.20 
lJ 
Polyxenus' Third Man 1s quite similar to the previous 
Third Man in that there is found a need (supposedly) 
tor a third man apart from Form and particular. It is 
sim1lar too ln that it stresses the difference between 
the Form Man and the particular man and in doing so 
leads the way to a 'third man' without an infinite 
regress. But instead of using a common statement such 
as "man walks" for its basis, the second Third Man 
· hinges upon several ambiguities--or so 1t seems, the 
word •man• and Socrates• trouble with 'v1sibles.• 
Chern1ss wr1tesa 
The Flatonists say that 'man• (5 av~pwno½) 
exists by participation 1n the idea. Then 
what 1s B 11.\1-&pwno½ 1-;h ioh has its existence in 
relet1 on to the idea, · it cannot be a.(rrna.-.;~pwno½, 
for th a t is the 1dea, nor can 1t be the par-
ticular man, for they do not say o ~l~ &v~pwno½ 
but 5 lf v-&pwno½. Thsrefcre the subject of this 
Platomc dictum must be a 'third man.• The 
use o~ the universal subject 'man' instead of 
•each and every particular man' gave Polyxenus 
the opportunity to argue that the statement of 
the Pl.atonists implied a 'third man' · apart 
from t he particular and the idea although they · 
admitted the existence of these two alone.21 
So it seems that en ambiguity rests again with 
'mEL~• and the desire to posit some 'relation' between 
Form and particular, at least as Alexander has recorded. 
That we know .of the argument third-hand (not t· .-:om 
Po1yxenus, not from Phan1as, but from Alexander) may 
14 
present even more difficulties. John Burnet, for 
· example, contends tha.t Polyxenus { 1n the above argument) . 
uses two terms for 'participation' · (µti;ox~, µc:i;oucrCa), 
which Plato never uses which leads him to believe that 
Polyxenus never intended his argument against Plato (or 
Socrates). 22 Taylor, taking the cart before the horse 
for a change, does not give ouch weight to Burnet's 
conclusion for who else can the argument be against? 
The Pythagorean Timaeus 1s, according to Taylor, the 
only other 'friend of the Forms• who held that par-
ticulars exist by virtue of' 'participating' in the 
Forms and that Timaeus "avoids the use of the words 
µt't£X£LV and µE~t~L~ in a very remarkable manner •••• "23 
There does, of course, remain the possibility that 
Polyxenus' words did undergo some modification in the 
hand-downs, 1f so, Burnet•s conclusion is indeed shaky. 
Taylor reminds us that one's preference for words 
(Polyxenus' preference for µc:i;ox~ over µt"t£XEL'\) need 
not change things too much, if any. 24 
Clemens Baeumker, finding the ambiguous 'man' of 
the Platon1sts too ambiguous, decided to clarify matters 
by interpreting 'man' in the first line of Polyxenus' 
argument as a .E!irtlcular mant "der s1nnfall1ge Mensch"; 25 
further, he makes this transposition; 
This cannot be the av~oav~pwno~, who 1s 
15 
· the Form, nor yet the particular man who 1s 
by participation (µc~oxD) in the Form.2° 
Whereas, however, as shown on page twelve of this thesis, 
neither the Form nor the particular, 1s in virtue of 
participation in the Form. Baeumker seems to remove the 
third man by making it a particular man who 1s by 
participation. And, as Cherniss points out, if there 
1s no 'third man' 1n the argument, why should 1t be 
called a Third Man Argument? Why should 1t be aimed 
against the Theory of Forms? 27 By still other commenta-
tors, Baeumker's interpretation is met with mixed 
emotion. Taylo?' reluctantly held to Baeumker's ·uords 
at first, attempting to see an 'intermediate man' much 
1n ·the sense that Plato has 'mathernaticals' as inter-
mediates between the Forms and particulars in Mathema.tics1 
b t th l t d ~ A, d ' d 1 28 u . en 1e re urne ... o .:\.,.exan- er s ren er ng. Burnet 
claims that he is following Baeumker's transpos1t1onr 
however, the conclusion he draws shows just the contrary. 
Burnet claims that part1culars stand in nQ relation 
to the Forms--th~t only some perfect instance could 
and that this would be the 9 th1rd man•29--but Baeumker's 
transposition already suggests that particulars do 
stand 1n relation tot.he Forms via participation. And 
Chernlss, as implied above, would like to toss Baeumker 
clean away. 
16 
Robert G. Turnbull, ~-ho is currently working on 
his own translation and commentary of the Parmen1des, 
writes that Polyxenus' version of the argument 1s 
implied in the Parmenides at 1JOA-1JOE.30 Turnbull 
seems to read the argument much the same way that 
Alexander does and attempts to show that there still 
remains a 'third man•a a sort of odd 'third man• that 
appears as a share in a particular man, but of no real 
threat to Plato's theory. What Turnbull finds important 
1s that this argument does allow a 'third man,' although 
if something like 'Likeness,• 'Beauty,• or 'Justice• 
were to replace 'Man,• the argument would not be so 
forceful, he goes as far as to say that the argument 
would not even be valid against these. In other words, 
this argument seems to be a limited attack upon the 
Forms--or at least against a limited number of them 
(Forms of v1s1bles).Jl At Parmen1des 130A Parmenides 
asks whether as there is Likeness apart and distinct 
from the likeness we have, if there is also Man, apart 
and distinct from us. Socrates replies that he is not 
sure I he had long hadi trouble with making a decision 
about 'v1s1bles,' although things such as f i lth and mud 
could net be since they a:re not oapable _of st riving to 
be better filth a..~d mud. The translation of Parmen1des 
130A-1JE as Turnbull gives it 1s as followss 
Parmenides Socrates, your zest for argument 
1s thoroughly admirable. Tell me, is this 
your invention, this distinction separating, 
on the one side, the forms themselves, on 
the other, those which partake of them? And 
do you think that there is Likeness itself, 
separate from the likeness we have, and One 
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and Many and all the rest of which you just now 
heard Zeno speak? · 
Socrates Certainly. 
Parmenides Are there also these, a form just 
by itself for just, another for beautiful~ 
another for good, and others for all such 
things? 
Socrates Yes. 
Par~enides And what of this? Is there a form 
for man, separate from ourselves and all like 
· us--a form by itself for man, another for fire, 
another for water? 
Socrates I have many times, Parmen1des, been 
in straits concerning these, troubled whether 
one must speak this w~ or otherwise concerning 
.them. 
Parmen1des And what about these, which may seem 
to be absurdities, hair, mud, dirt, and other 
quite undignified and trifling things? Are you 
in straits whether one must say- that there is a 
· separate form for each of these also, a form 
which is other than the th1ngs which we hold 1n 
our hands? 
Socrates Not at all. These are simply what we 
see them to be. It would be too disgusting to 
believe that there 1s a form for these. Even ·so, 
I have sometimes been distressed at the thought 
that what holds for one thing does not hold for 
all. But then, when I take this stance, I flee, 
lest I per1sh in an abyss of babbling. So, when 
I come back to those things which we just now 
ss1d do have forms, I work away at various matters 
concernin g them • 
.F..,arm.eni~~ You're still young, e...~d ph1losophy has 
not yet gripped you as firmly as I think it will 
later. Then you will be disgusted at none of 
these things. Right now, in your youth, YQ~ are 
over attentive to other people's opinions.) 
Socrates had earlier brought out the point that Forms 
must be separate from particulars to account for an 
,· 
•t 
' . ' 
individual being both 'like' and 'unlike.• That 1s, a 
man can be said - to be both short a."1d tall without being 
.,.· ... ·• 
contradictory as long as short and tall are not actually 
the same as the ind1v1dual. He can partake of 'Shortness' 
when someone 1s taller than he and he can part~ke of 
'Tallness• when someone is shorter than he. He can be 
both short and tall in relation to these other individuals. 
Although perhaps a clever answer, Parmenides wants 
Socre.tes to make it completely clear and 1t is implied 
that there oould be a problem (at least with 'v1s!bles•). 
Turnbull states the implied arguments 
It a given 1nd1v1dual is r. then, to avoid 
the d1ff1cuJ.t1es of the Zeno- argument, we mus_t 
think that the individual partakes of a form F 
and that the form 1tself ts simply in the sense 
of being self-identical. To partake of Fis, 
by the very meaning of the word; , to have - a share 
of F. Thus we must distinguish between the 
1ndiv1dual, the fQ:rm, s.nd the share the individual 
has of that form. J.J · 
Although this may be a difficulty with 'man,• Turnbull 
points out the difference with 'Likeness• with the 
following example, 
If Jones (a man) partakes of Likeness, he has 
or comes to have a (second) like in him. But 
for Man (or Horse, etc.) the situation 1.s quite 
different. If Jones (first man) partakes of or 
comes to partake of Man ( aeeond man), he has or 
comes to have a ( third) man in h1m. But Jones 
al~eady 1s a man: The contrast, in Parmen1des' 
questions 1 between 'separate from . the likeness 
we have 11 and •separate from ourselves and all 
others like us,' seen in this-light, 1s startling. J4 
• I 
I I 
I 
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1s only impli ed here becau s ~- Socxates -d! .d not really 
answer that- there was: a .. Form. Man. Aceoriiing · to Turnbull, 
then,. if ''v1s1-bles• · are ta.ken - as . Forms, you will have 
the queerness of act11ttll'y --h-aving · another man in you so 
that . yo ·tt migh.t be c:aD.e.d: a . man-, , whom~you . already in fact 
are. Turnb .ul I. a.ugge-st .a-1. "Socrates : ottght .· to be 'in straits' 
about this. mat:ter: .. J5 . But: this .. interme di ate •third man,' 
coming ab·out as- a share:: apart · from :._ the ~.Form, again, like 
the first "thtrd man-, .• does - n-ot· deny th e uniqueness . of .· 
Plato's Fo.rms,. but t.hi.a time only that · something rather. : 
strange occurs .. when- 'vlaibl:.es ·• · have corr e:spcnding Forms 
are, that 1s., by · hav1ng a s~are ... 1n .this .case. 
I think,. however, t ·ha.t - there . coul d be a way out for 
this 'queern~ .sa • t pos ·s:1bly by- def1n1ng 1'part1c1pat1on' 
in a way oth a r tharr . shar.ing; as Socrates -does go on to 
attempt (and lat .er P.armenides : himself) and further by 
treating 'v.isible _s-•· unI1:ke : 'ilI!lD.anent .characters.• Taking 
once · again AI.I en .' 's· noti :orr : of : Forms ~as , exemplary causes, 
if the Fo·rm Ma"l·. (Man-. I:) causes : Jones : to -be ·relatively man 
(Man II), the n. nhy shoul.:d . Jones _ come . to : have a."l addi tione.l 
man 1n hi.m? That . is, . J:ones .'. is :-not even a . first .men l,l.'1t11 
he partakes · o f' the Fonn Ma."'l. , And ·s1nce -1t ·1s the second 
man who 1s '-r e:lat1 .vely• · to . the Form. 1t -makes no sense 
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nor is there any need to sneak 1n another man. The 
difference between 'immanent characters• (such as the 
beauty, justice, likeness, etc., that we have) and 
'v1s1bles' (me, you, the fellow next door, the neigh-
bor's dog, etc.) should be shown in th1s way, the 
likeness we have 1s so in virtue of Likeness-itself1 
the man that I am is so in virtue of Man-itself. I 
do not alreadr ss a man oome to partake of ·Man and have 
another man put in mei I can, however, already as man, 
come to partake of ( to a gre!Lter extent .) T!\llness ( I 
no doubt already have~ share unless I am the smallest 
possible thing), retire to my stretcher and energe with 
a la.rger >.share of tallness 1n me. So it seems that 
Plato co ll.19: have Forms of •vis i bles ' without rtL"llli ng 
into this particular 'third man• as a..~ intermediate 
share within a particular. 
This route could possibly pose a problem but only 
1f combination of Forms were impossible. Plato speaks 
of Forms as standards which all else should be striving 
for (Phaedo ?5A). One can strive to be Just, or to be 
Beaut1ful--but if one 1s already a man, how can he strive 
to be Man? He would have to strive to be a better man--
that is, to be Just, Beautiful, and the like. Th1s 
would suggest a kind of 'communion of Forms,' another 
sense of 'p.art1c1pating' which I believe Plato reintro-
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duces in the second part of the Parmenidea and elaborates 
more fully upon later 1n th~ So~~f~i . But more of this 
later in ·conneotion with the main version of the Third 
Man Argument yet to be considered. 
For now, this second Third Man, like the previous, 
does not, I think, pose any special problem to Plato's 
Theory of Forms,:36 At best 1t eome:s 1n as the queerness 
of hsvtng a man 1n you, but with R. E. Allen's insight 
into Plato's ontology (Forms as exemplary causes and 
particulars being relat1onai _. entities) , Plato ( so far) 
has no 'third man' to worry about--and as shown in the ; 
Republ1~ (597C) and the Timaeus (48E-51B), with Forms 
of all visibles in the latter}, he didn't. 
A Third Third Man 
The third Third Man part I (found at the beg1n.~ing of 
Alexander's discussion) 1s generally accredited to Eudemus 
and its implications lead one to the infinite regress found 
in part II, Alexander ascribing that part to Aristotle, 
It 1s this Third Man wh1ch brings the most controversy~-
that it seems to be valid and that Plato poses it hims~lf 
in the Parmenides (although exactly how it 1s valid, what 
it i.s val1d . age.inst, where it is found, or 1f there 1s an 
escape from it is debatable). First it would be 1n order 
to give Alexru,der's renderlnga 
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Part I. 
The argument which brings in the 'third man' 
1s as follows, They - say that the substances 
which are predicated generally are the true 
and proper substances, and that these are the 
Forms. Further, things which are~ one 
another are so in virtue of participation 
in one and the same something which properly 
is that, and this is the Form. But if this 
is so, and if that which is predicated in 
like manner of several things, when not 
identical with any one of those things, is 
another thing over and above them--and i't; 
is just because the Form of Man, though 
predicated of particular men, is not identical 
with sny of them that it is a kind--there 
must be a third man besides man particular--
as• e.g. Socrates or Plato--and the Form, 37 which last 1s also itself numerically one. 
Part II. 
If what ls truly predicated of a plurality of 
subjects is a reality alongsi~e those of which 
it ls predicated and distinct from them--and 
those who postulate the Forms believe they can 
prove this ••• , if so, I say there will be 
a 'third man.' For 1f Man as predicate is other 
than the ~ of whom theterm is predicated, 
and has a substantial being of its otm, and 
1f man 1s predicated in like man.~er, both of 
particula .r men and of the Form, then there 
must be a third man distinct both from the 
particular men and from the Fo:rm.. And in the 
same way a fourth, predicable in 11ke manner 
of this third man, of the Form and of particular 18 
man, and again a fifth, and so en!!! 1ndefinitum.~ _ 
Thus, the first part of the argument 1s basically 
th1sa 1f we grant that substances are the Forms and 
that these are predicated of particular things in this 
world, and further that all these particular things are 
like one another in virtue of their participation in the 
Forms (the particulars imitating the one over the many), 
I ' 
ihen -to give the unity which ·was p~t~.Aps th~ ptntt,oa@ 
of the Platonic doctrine, _ one must somehow unite the 
Form, say of Man, and the particular man with some 'third 
.man.• 
Plato's theory of Forms, had, of course~ come at a 
time of philosophical chaos. The Sophists at the end of 
the fifth century B.C. had brought harm as well as good 
to the people of Greece. No doubt the Sophists taught 
many useful things, but too often they played with words 
making things seem as they wer~ not or making them seem 
as they would like them to be. Absolute truth and 
standards lost their reign to a sort of relativism where 
'opinion' ruled and almost ~Y. opinion could rule 
because language itself was ambiguous enough to allow 
for 'proofs' (the Third Man Argument stands as an example) 
of practically anything. "Might makes right," Opinion . 
1s truth," and the world is msde up of many constantly 
changing things. Greec~ was in a turmoil ethically, 
epistemologically and ontologically. Plato sought to 
restore unity and the doctrine of absolute unchang ,ing 
Forms seemed the answer. The attempt was an economical 
one, as Cherniss saysa 
The dialogues of Plato, I believe, will 
furnish evidence to show thet he considered 
1t n'!:cessary to f111d a single hypothesis 
which would at once solve the problems of 
these several spheres and also create a 
rationally unifie d cosmos by establishing 
the connection among the separate phases 
of experience.J9 
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Chern1ss goes on tc show that although Plato's first 
interest was Ethics, Epistemology a."ld eventually Ontology 
entered in to give the complete picture. Joseph Moreau 
also sees the Platonic doctrine ar1s1ng in the form of · 
explanatory roles finding the same basic functions as 
did Cherniss1 'gnoselogical,' serving as the foundation 
for knowledge, •axiological,' serving as a foundation 
for values and ethics, and 'cosmological,' serving as 
the foundation for the existence of the universe. 40 The 
first part of this third Third Man, bringing in yet 
another notion of unity, finds some 'third man• necessary 
to . unite what appears to be two separate existences 1 
Forms and particulars. The trouble 1s, despite appear-
. ances, the creator of this argument 1s so bound 1n the 
world of flux, so set, no doubt, on the notion that he 
himself ia the stable entity, that kno1ngly or not, he 
1s taking ~yt1culars as substances (as well as Forms) 
which Plato would never think of doing. Going back to 
Allen's . distinction yet again, particulars are relational 
entiti ~s and pot substances. Forms and particulars are 
1n no need of some further relation to unite them. The 
Forms and their dependents already constitute a unity--
a sort of 'organism• as William F. Lynch41 would have it. 
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But more or this lat~r. Let 1t suffic~ for now to say, 
1f knowlngly or unknowingly ·one also takes p~rt1cu.lars 
t 
as substances (as well as Forms), then one has the 
existence of two separate substances--and thep it 1s 
_ natural to suppose that some sort of •relation' should 
exist _ between the two, yielding, 1! you wish, a 'third 
man. ,42 
The second part of the argument, as Alexander states 
1t, supposes that 1f the Form Me.n 1s something other than 
the particular men it 1s predicated of, and that both 
of _ these are Man--that 1s, that Man can be predicated 
of both the Form and particular (they are both called 
1
-man •), then this last 'man• would appear as a 'third 
man• standing distinct from and over the Form Man and 
the particular man. This 'third man' would then have 
the status of the 'one over many' and hence appear to be 
s Form; Form Man II. A.~d then, of course, it might 
be asked if this new Form can be said to be somehow like 
the Form Man I and the particular man and the same in 
reverse. The answer seems to be a surely, they are all 
called man. So this new 'man' becomes a fourth 1n the 
echeme of things (Form Man III)1 if one presses this 
matter further, a fifth, sixth, a seventh, an infinite 
number of men will appear, each standing as a new Form 
(a.~other duplicate) over the group of other duplicate 
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Forms, the original Form and its particulars. 
This is the argument _that Ale~~nder attributes to 
Aristotle, orginally recorded in Aristotle's Concerning 
Forms (now lost) and no doubt this 1s the variation of 
the argument Aristotle uses since he elaborates on lt 
further 1n his Sophistical Refutations at 178b35-179. 
I give here Turnbull's _translation of that passages 
(There is) also (the argument) that there is 
a third man besides the B8me (i.e., man) and 
those with regard to each (individuals). For 
neither 'man' nor any common term signifies 
a tode ti, but rather a quality, a relation, 
a mode, or some such. Likewise 'Coriscus' and 
CCor1scusj Musician'. (Are they the same or 
different;?J For the one signifies a tode ti, 
the other a quality, so t ·hat the same7T:"e:; 
musician) is not set apart. It 1s not the 
setting apart which makes the third man, but 
rather the uni ting ir1to a tode t1 ti For there 
·will not be a~ ll encompass"ing both Callias 
!:!}_~ the one who 1s man. Nor will 1 t make any 
difference if on~ wer~ to say that the set-
apart is not a. tod e t1 but :rather a qualtty. 
For there will still be & one besides the 
many, fo~ example, man. It is therefore 
cle~r th a t one must not grant that something 
predlcated--1n common--of all is a tode ti, 
but rather that it signifies a qu8lf.ty 1 a 
relation, a quantity, or some sucho~3 
Now, Aristotle ls correct, I think, 1n saying that this 
'third man• comes about by connecting the Form and the 
particular, he is correct too 1n saying that 1t 1s a 
mistake to set apart a •second• m,an in the first place--
~--for the exact opposite reason he gives. The 
mistake, he thinks, 1s to set apart the f.2.r.! as a this 
(~ ti)-- a 'this' for Aristotle meaning •substance.• 
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He . 1s, I think, flatly wrong, ta111ng into the same 
situation that we found Eudemus 1n the first part of 
the argument as Alexander records it. True, it is a 
mistake to set ~meth1ng apart, but that •something• 
1s not the Form, but rather the Ea.!:'ticular. It is 
when one treats particulars as substa..~ces that the 
'third man' {and in this case infinitely others) 
appears • . It 1s when one believes that •man' 1.s a 
predicate and that it can be ]redicated EL both Form 
and particular tha-t the 'third man• appears. It is when 
particulars are literally senarated from the Forms 
that the 'third man' appears. We must remember, and 
remember always, that Plato has truned what 1'7e commonly 
perceive as reality inside out. This is a relational 
-
sort of. -existence that we have, true existence is 1n 
the realm of th~ Forms. These Forms are not mere 
abstractions standing e.s qua.lit1~s o:r attributes to 
substance; they ar~ substantial ~nd the higher the 
Form the richer it is. As Cornford says, 
Suppose that Form (Being; to stand st the head 
of the whole h1erar8chy. If it were th e b~rest 
of all abstractions, nothing could be go t out 
of 1t by an attempt to divide it 1nto parts. 
It would have no parts, but be si mple and 
indivisible as the One Being of Par.:nen1desa 
In Plato's view the highest Form, wheth er it 
be c•lled 'Bein g ' or 'the One' or ' t h~ Good', 
must not be the poorest, but th ~ rlchest, a 
universe of real being, a whole con t a inin g 
all that is real 1n a single order, a One Being 
that 1s also many. Such a Form 1s as far as 
possible ·from .resembling an Aristotelian 
category, for the categories ar~ precisely 
the barest of abst r ac t ion, a t th l!lJ.furthest 
remove from substa ntial reality. 4 . 
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It seems that Aristotle d1d not learn h1s lesson 
too well, if he d1d, 1n fact, have access to Plato's 
Parmen1des (as he likely dld) or else he would never 
have presented the Third Man Argument as a valid objec-
tion to Plato's Theory of Forms. He, like most of us, 
is ,too much caught up in the world of appearance. But 
this argument does show quite well our predicament in 
th1s existence, we are faced with problems of predica~ 
t1on, participation, imitation, degrees of reality, unity, 
and our thinking can even lead to infinite regress. This 
Third Man Argument, unlike the other two, stresses not 
only the difference some construe betwee ·n Forms and 
particulars, but also the likeness, and Forms giving 
up their uniqueness give rise to infinite duplications. 
Since th1s 1s the first Third Man to bring forth a 
regress, perhaps we should pause for a moment to diecuss 
'regress' itself along with some other 'instances' of it. 
' -
Regress Itself 
Regress~ in 1nf1n1ttu~ has b~en a frustrating ploy 
for quite a while and it does not show any signs of 
letting up. Zeno of Elea's line of dichotomy, depressed 
fleet-footed Achilles a loser to a turtle, arrow (alas) 
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without eny movement, and ch1!1.r1ots passing in half of 
length of time the whole ler,.gth o~ t1me--plus some 
'third man' does not add up to the whole of inf1n1ty. 
Jorge Luis Borges 45 adds to the 11s .t Cornell us _ Agrippa, 
the skeptic who conjectured that every proof stands · 
1n 1need of a previous proof, hence we cannot be certain 
of .anything (Hypotyposes, I, 166), And also to the 11st 
goes Sextus Emp1ricus who has no faith in definitions 
since each of the words within the definition needs 
also to be defined, and then, or course, thos~ words 
need defining and so on forever (Hypoty~oses, II, 207). 
Perhaps less well known is Chl.lang Tzu, who according 
to ,Borges, uses infinity to dispel the idea held by 
some Chinese monists that the Universe was a single 
thing even though it consist .ed of Ten Thousand Things. 
Immediately there is more than one "because cosmic unity 
and the declaration of that unity are already two things, 
those two and the declaration of their duality are 
alr~ady three: those three and the declaration of their 
trinity are already four. ... (Waley, Three ~ays of Thou5h~ 
in Ancient China, p. 25). This example is not too far 
removed from Plato's own discussion of Unity 1n the 
second part of the Parmenide~, 46 there, Permenides, in 
his dialectical exercise i1'1tended for younger members of 
the Academy, says that Unity cannot be one because already . 
there is the Being that it ha.s, then the Difference 
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between that Being and · Unity, and then the ~ifferences 
between the three and so ort ( the usef~lt1ess of this 
particular argument 0 as I see it, will be shown in 
Chapter III). Finally, concerning regress, Borges asks, 
"Is 1t · a legitimate instrument of inquiry or merely a 
bad habit?" 47 
Bertrand Russell tends to bring an answer, he dis-
tinguishes between e harmless regress and a logically , 
vicious type~ The former is constituted only by implica-
tions between propositions. There is no real objection 
to say that 'proposition l' leads to 'proposition,• 
which leads in turn to 'proposition 3,' and so on into 
1nf1n1ty, 'proposition l' can have some positive true 
meaning--and that true propositions follow from it is 
indeed harmless. 48 Taylor insists that the 'formal 
implication' of the Idealists involves this kind of 
regress (which might more adequately be called a progress), 
In fact, on the hypothesis of 'Idealists• of 
the kind who usually make the most frequent 
employment of the 'regress• against their 
opponents, every true proposition 'p' must 
imply an 1nfinite~1es of true propos-ft1ons. 
For they commonly hold that a proposition 
cannot be true without being actually known 
by some mind and that this 1s part of what we 
~ by calling 'p' ture. Hence the true 
proposition, •x knows p•, and this, being 
itself a true proposition, again implies 
•y--who may of course be identical with x-- 49 knows that x lmows p' and so on in 1ndefinitum. 
- -
The second type of regress that Russell ~efers to 
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1s the vicious one. This regress m.e.kes even . the first 
proposition meaningless--since the regress comes out of 
an attempt to determine its meaning. Russell . chooses 
even not to call such an utterance a proposition since 
propositions much have some determinate meaning. If 
to arrive at the meaning of a 'proposition' we must first 
pass through an infinite number of others, we shall never . 
arrive at that proposit1on,50 
The question which comes to the subject of this 
thesis, 1s, of course, whether the regress found in the 
th1~d Third Man Argument is such that 1t shows that 
propositions involving the Platonic Forms, particulars, 
and their 'relationship' (as posed 1n the first part of 
the . Parmenides) to be somehow lackir1g in meaning. If 
one assumes that the symmetrical (two-way) relation of 
particulars to Forms and of Forms to particulars is 
what Plato actually held, the argument, although vicious, 
is useful in that it clears the air for other theories--
as Aristotle no doubt thought it d1d for his own. Or 
some might think that the argument was such a blow to 
Plato that he revised his ofm theory. If, however, one 
shows that Plato never intended a symmetrical 'rela-
tionship' (or any sort of relationship between Forms and 
par~iculars) 51 then one might say that he was actually 
'clearing the air' for his~ theory--trying to eliminate 
or at lea.st at present trying to ~;p~s~ foolish notions 
•· 
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rooted in the ambiguities of language. The latter 1s 
what this thesis intends to give some evidence for, as 
w1ll be seen 1n the following chapters. 
' 
Notes 
1r e.m well aware that this is not Zeno's Stadium 
Paradox (named so because of objects tre.ve1,_ng the whole 
time in half the time in a stadium), however, anything 
worthwhile (such as the performance of some 'third man') 
should take place in a stadium for all philosophers to 
enjoy. Apparently 1t was actually the case in early 
Greece that dramatists and dialogue-writers were given 
audiences at the Olympic Games. See Gilbert Ryle, 
Plato's Progress {Cam.bridges Cambridge University Press, 
1966), PP• JJ-JS. 
2Unless specified otherwise I will be using the 
translations of Plato's dialogues found in The Collected 
Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (New Yorkt Pantheon Books, 1964). 
3!J_maeus 48E, 50C. 
4r am using 'Man• here as an example although · 
Plato sometimes seems to have doubts that there could 
even be such a Form. Socrates at Pe.rmenides 130C ex-
presses his doubt that there are Forms for man and the 
like1 however .. I doubt that Socrates is really the mouth-
piece of Plato as I will show later. Further, there 
does seem to be evidence to indicate Plato's willingness 
to include Forms for every sort of thing {Reµubl1c 597C, 
Cratylus '.389B, Timaeus 51B..;52c, Seventh Letter 3°1f2Di 
and the Academy, after all, does call the argument the 
Third Man. 
5Phaedo lOOC-lOlC 
6This will be demonstrated 1n Chapter III. 
7aepubl1c 59?C, Parmenides 1J2A, -:r~.maeus 31A. 
Br will be using A. E. Taylor's translation of the 
arguments recorded by Alexander. A. E. Taylor, Parmenides, 
Zeno, and Socrates, in Ppilosop_h_!,9.,!l_,e_tud1~ (F'reeport; 
New Yorks Books for Libraries Press, 19681, pp. 54-59. 
9Taylor, Parmen1des 1 Zeno, and Socrates, PP• 55-56. 
lOTaylor. Pa.rmenides, Zeno and Socrates, 
_, _ ---~ - pp. 57-58. 
11Taylor, Parm.en:tdes 1 Zeno..L. e.Ej. S.2£!~~es, P• 58. 
12Harold Chem1ss, Ar1s~otle's Cr1t1c_!__sm of Plato 
and the Academy (New Yorks Russell and Russell, l9b2), 
pp. 501-502. ·. · .;--. -~ 
·., 
13a. E. Allen •s term. See "P.a:rt1c1pat1on and Predica-
tion 1n Plato's Middle Dialogues," 1n Studies in Plato's 
Metap!'!ls1cs, ed. by R. E. Allen (New Yorks The Humanities 
Press, l9b5l. 
14Allen, "Participation and Predication," P• ·46. 
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II 
THE THIRD MAN IN THE PARMENIDES 
The 'Parmen1des' Itself 
Although one cannot be certain of precise dates, 
there tends to be general agreement that the Parmen1des 
stands as one of Plato's 'middle dialogues•--com1ng 
after the ~e Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, Pha.edru~, 
and coming before the Theaetetus, §_ophist, Statesman, 
. . 1 
Philebus, and Laws. (Two of Plato's dialogues, the 
Cra.tylus and the Timaeus, for various reasons, 2 seem 
not so stable 1n the accepted chronology of Plato's works. 
My 1nterpretat1on of the Parmen1des leads me to believe 
that both come after that dialogue but it 1s of no great 
significance to my thesis where they come--thst Plato 
wrote them at all 1s the important thing.) The Parmenldes 
itself has met with !!lany reactions; its role in Plato's 
development has been greatly debated. It has been thought 
to be a turning point in Plato's Theory of Forms 3--h1s 
theory undergoing considerable change after the problems 
presented in that dialogue. It has also been thought to 
be of little significance ph1losophically1 the arguments 
in the first pa.rt (including the Third Nan) being mere 
sophisms or that they are invalid and Plato know they 
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were, in the second part of the dialogue Plato turns the 
tables and meets the sophists using sophisms against what 
4 they hold true a a joke. . There 8.re, however, some com-
mentators who find the dialogue not only serious, but 
also having positive philosophical import. Gilbert Ryle 
(in 1939) thought that the whole dialogue could be seen 
as an introduction to the · theory of types--the first part 
of the dialogue presenting arguments to demonstrate that 
it is illegitimate to speak of Forms as having any sort 
of 'relation' to particulars, and the second part pre-
senting arguments to show that some Forms must be treated 
in a unique way. 5 Closer yet, I think, to finding the 
unity of the Parmenides is William F. Lynch, he finds 
that the 'one-many' problem persists throughout--the 
second part of the dialogue attempting to answer the 
f1rst. 6 But, the first to argue for the unity of the 
dialogue, Gilbert Ryle, now thinks the Parmenides is a 
piecemeal of two works hastily joined together for the 
purpose of not getting lost. 7 It might be well to con-
sider the division. 
The Division 
According to Gilbert Ryle 1n Platofs Progress the 
first part of the Parmenides was bei.ng written during 
Plato• s switch over from er1stic dialogues ( 1n which Plato 
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mostly recounts d1alogue.s actually _ he~rd) to h1s dialectic 
(1n which the dialogue become little more than a 'yes,' 
'no,' or 'so it seems• alongside full blown arguments). 
Ryle thinks that Plato might have originally intended to 
deliver it at the Olympic games, but that 1t is more 
likely that it was the sort of thing he might prefer to 
give to his followers at the Academy. 8 In t~o previous 
dialogues, the Crito and the Phaedo, Plato . had basically 
renumerated earlier arguments from previous dialogues 
(~or51as, Meno, and Alcibiades I) which seems to indicate 
that Plato was running out of material--and henceended 
his public performances.9 Ryle saysa 
• , • his concern for the tastes of the laity 
was now being displaced by concern for the judgements of the members of the Academy, He 
was ceasing to work for success as a composer 
of disputation mimes and correspondingly the 
Athenian c1t1zens 1~ere ceasing to care for his co mpositions. 
Now, as business-like as the first part of the Parmenldes 
1s, the second part 1s undoubtedly for the more serious 
philosopher wishing rigorous training in dialectic · (as :=-
1t 1s implied at Parmenides 136E), Ryle supposes that 
there were no st11dents ripe for this sort of reasoning at 
the time when the first part of the d.1alogue was written 
which might suggest that the second part was indeed 
11 
written later. It might also explain why the dialogue 
changes from o:rat1o .9,Q,liqu~ ( at 137C) to orat1o rec ta. 
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(with only one 'he said'}. G. E. L. Owen in his "Notes 
on Ryle's Plato" is -quick to point -9ut, however, this, 
Plato doesn't even keep up the "Antiphon told _me tha.t 
Pythodorus told him tha.t Socrates said ••• " 1n the 
first part1 further, that Plato has been known to shift 
the sense 1n the Republic as well (134B-D}. 12 But in 
any case, whether or not some time elapsed between the 
writing of the first and second parts (to allow for 
_ students to mature) , I do not agree with Ryle that the 
two are not complementary, nor that Plato's motive in 
jo1n1ng the two was simply to tack them together lest 
they be lost. That the two parts are topicelly com-
patible will next be considered. 
The Unity of the Parmenides 
There are several reasons, I think, to assume unity 
in the Parmenides. To begin with, Parmenides is the 
leader of the dialogue throughout (despite the fact thet 
1t is .not related third-hand in the second part), a..~d 
in each 'part• of the dialogue alongside Parmenides one 
finds a young, inexperienced student of philosophy (first 
Socrates, l a -er Aristoteles). Further still the 'one-
many' probl em i s confronted five times in the dialogue, 
twice -in th ~i rst part ('particular to attributes,' 
'Form to pa r t i culars') and three times 1n the second -part 
(The One to Forms,' 'Form to particulars,' 'particular to 
~ttr1 but -es') • This -latte -r consideration will become more 
clear in~ summary of the Parmenid~ yet to come, and 
hopefully substantially clearer 1n Chapter III where the 
second part of the Parmenides is suggested as an escape 
from the 'third man.' The former will be discussed 
immediately. 
Historically. most commentators agree, this dialogue 
(the Parmenides) co ·uld not have taken place. 13 This would 
meet with Ryle's v1.ew that Plato is venturing off on his 
own, leaving behind actual recordings of Academic Moots. 14 
Why, one .might ask. is Parmenides given the lead role? _ 
Cornford suggests that Plato was quite impressed with . 
Parmen1des and that he"• •• looked upon himself as the 
successor of the man who had first drawn, however imper-
fectly, the distinction between the intelligible word of 
truth and reality e:nd a sensible world of seeming and 
becoming. 0 15 Anot h er reason might be Plato's growing 
desire for rigorous dialectic as the historical Parmenides 
was known to have had. A. E. Taylor thinks that arguments 
such as the Third . Man were just the sort of arguments that 
the historical Zen,o might have and ln fa.ct probably did 
x-a1se _to "friends oi' Forms," Plato or otherwise (Pyth ag or-
ea.."'ls )--and that these arguments were only sophisms •16 
'J~tiy lor thinks tha t Plato knew these were mere sophisms 
being brought aga in st his theory, so in part two of the 
Parmen1des he sh ows Parmen1des hanging himself with his 
own logic. Tay,-1or says, speakin g for Plato1 ''I can 
easily do with you as Zeno did with the critics of his 
Master Parmeni de s--give you back as good as you bring 
and better, 1n a way which will be highly d1vert1r1g to 
a lover of dia1 e ctic.» 17 
The tro ub1e is that the Parmen1des presented 1n 
the dialogue is n ot particularly true to the historical 
Parmen1des and h is 'One.• The dialogue does not argue 
against the ex1s t ,ence of multiple Forms, for these are 
assumed 1n the fi rst part and, I think, proven 1n the 
second part. 18 The first part is rather arguing against 
particular lite ral interpretations of a rels.tionshiE of 
particulars to 't he Forms. And at Parmen1des 1J5B-C 
Parmen1des doe s n ot conclude that there cannot be many 
Forms, but rath er 1mpl1es that we must look for some 
other sense of •partaking' to exhibit the 'one-many' 
(which, by the · way, leads one to expect some attemµt 
later in th e dl.1&1:ogue since Forms are ne eded if we are 
to have knowle dge ). Parmenides, historically, did not 
doubt, perhaps II the existence of at least one Form (•one') 
nnd p ~rh&ps to t hrow doubt on Plato's multiple Forms 
might a lso suc c«!red in making h1s own Form less secure. 19 
So I t hink it is possible that the historical Parmen1des 
might give the s ort of arguments appearing in the first 
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half as well as the second~ howe7er, he would not be 
assuming many Forms as this Parmen1des most certainly 
does. This leads me .to conclude that 'Parmen1des• 
1s more Plato than Parmenides. Plato has been exhibiting 
his Forru Theory in earlier dialogues--in the Phaedo most 
expliei tlr. Forms being difficult to know and to speak 
or, the fhaedo 1s full of analogies. And perhaps, as 
is often the case with students, they take their profes-
sor's words too literally and further impose their o~m 
notions (consciously not not)s and it just might be that 
Plato, . in the guise of Parmenides (1n the first part of 
the dialogue) 1s showing his students, followers of 
Socrates like himself (represented by the X,Qung, inex-
perienced Socrates), the ridiculous things that happen , 
when they do so. The 'third man' is one such result. 
And he , does this 1s such a cunning way as not to arrest 
their zest for knowledge. He does not want to belittle 
his students; he wants to guide them to his true doctrine. 
(If the foregoing 1s true, Aristotle apparently did not 
learn his lesson since he used the 'third man• as a 
valid argument against Plato himself.) But to understand 
his notion of 'partaking' one must understand the Forms 
and their 1.nt errelat1<:>ns. It 1s quite an exercise and not 
recommended fer just anyone. Socrates 1s asked to observe 
a preliminary e:r.erc1se in Parrn.enid.ean d1&lccttc and the 
\ ' 
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second pa.rt of the dialogue is s1.1ch e.n .exercise, and 
although it 1s difficult, the 'one-me.r1y' and 'partaking 
of' are on the way to being expressable. 
Summary of the Parmenides 
A rather short summary of the dialogue might go 
like this (the Third Man Argument will be considered in 
detail la.ter--so too the 'second part' of the Pa:rmenides)1 
Zeno begins in the dialogue by playing with the one-many 
problem as it appears 1n particulars--hoping to show 
Socrates the contradictions involved in believing that 
reality is composed of many rather than Pamenides• 'One.' 
How can~ particular both be like and unlike? (How can 
I be both short and tall1 hc;,w can I be one ·when I have 
four limbs and an 1ndif 1n1 te m.unber of other things, often 
contrar;y: within me?). The argument is not precisely given 
in the dialo gue, but since its theme is important through-
out and that one should know it in order that Socrates' 
reply be intelligible, I choose to give Turnbull's 
interpretation of it (his being the c~earest rendering I 
have found, 
First, suppose that A 1s A and that A 1s B. 
If A really 1s both A and B~-1t 1s both ·-one and 
the-same as rtself and one-and the same as B. 
Since 1t ls one and the same as itself and -
another, it 1s like itself and that other. Since 
1t is u..~qualifiedly the same, it 1s unqualifiedly 
like •••• But, to distinguish 'A is A' from 
•~is~•, we must say that &· ls different from 
B. Given the meaning of 'different from' (if you 
please, 'ts n.ot'), _we must say that it 1s un-
qualifiedly different from {no -•p~rt1cipat1on':) 
and thus unqualifiedly unlike another. But the 
meaning o'f '1s' (1.e,, 'is one and the same as') 
1n both •A is A' and 'A is B' must be the same, 
and the supposition requires that A is~ (or Q, 
or whatever). So if A is unqualifiedly different 
from B, it must be unqualifiedly different from 
and thus unqualifiedly unlike itself. So, grating 
that an entity may be both itself and another 
(which is what the supposition, 'If many are', 
amounts to), it must be unqualifiedly like and 
unlike both itself and that other. The same 
reasoning, of course, applies to A a.ndC, and to 
Band c, indeed to any aileged pairs of-entities 
we may-choose. 
Secon .d, and this step is comparatively simple, 
an entity which 1s 1.mqua11f1edly like 1 ts elf and 
another ts, by definition! a ~t ke9 An entity which 
1s unqua1ifiedly unlike itself and another is, 
by d.efin1 t1on, an unlike. 20 
To the above, which results in the notion that 
reality - as .tnw1y must be impossible, Soc·rates gives a 
reply that qualifies the '1s,' taking it no longer in 
the sense of ·•tdentity• but a new sense, 'partaking.• 
Socrates sugg .ests . that we 'partake of• several unique 
Forms, ;being identical with none of them. That 1s, we 
can partake oC Likeness and also Unlikeness. I can, for 
example, be like other men and unlike beds. By partaking 
of Man I also partake of Likeness with respect to myself. 
Or if another individual partakes of the Form Man, we 
partake of . Llken .ess with respect to each other. I can 
partake of more than one Form and so also partake of 
Unlikeness; I can partake of the Form Justice, whereas a 
bed cannot--s o the bed and I parta ke of the Form 
Unliken ess with respect to each ot her; What se ems con-
tradictory is not when qualffted ln this way. However, 
if one could sh ow that Unity Itself is Many or that 
Likeness Itse l1' is Unlike, that would be strange. The 
paradox that Zeno has presented is no paradox at all1 
contraries in particulars can be explained by the Form~. 
This might se em like an adequate answer that Socrates 
gives t however,, Parmenides presses him for clarity, 
exactly what do es 1 t ~ to 'partake'? With such a 
request Socr ate s abounds with various literal interpreta-
tions I none of which pro ·ve satisfa ctory. Socrates has 
implied that Forms are separate from particulars and 
that the uni que individual Forms are al so separate from 
each other--o -r at least he has ~ point ed out to Par-
menides that th ese are false assumptions. It seems, then, 
that there is a gap to fill and if some• partaking' fills 
it that notio n should be made as clear as possible. 
Socrat es first suggests a literal interpr etation of 
the word 'pa rta ke,' that being, ' have a sha r e (of).' 
This leads to problems for if one has a share of a Form, 
does one have t he whole Form or only a part of it? If 
particulars a.r e separate from the Forms, then the Forms 
are separate Crom themselves (which 1s ab surd). A par-
ticular canno t possess the whole Form because then 
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it would be all used up. If you .say that each particular 
may possess a part of the Form, strange things occur (for 
example, the Form Small would be 1arger than its part 1n 
the particular). 
Parmen1des then suggests that taking the literal 
mear1ing of Form would be no better. For if one still 
maintains that Forms are indeed quite separate from the 
particulars, then, in this case, an infinite regress will 
occur. If one looks at a number of things and they all 
look large and that Large is separate from the things looked 
at, and further if the large things and that specific 
'look' all look large, then there w111 be another Largeness 
by virtue they all appear large. And then one could look 
at all of those and find yet another Form Large and so 
on.21 
Socrates wonders, then, if Forms might be taken 
as thoughts. Although 'looks of Largeness' may be in-
finitely duplicated a thought which can only be in minds 
might escape the difficulties. Parmenides could, I think 
(and so also Turnbull) 22 have given some of the criticisms 
of the above argument once more, but, to avoid duplication 
and show further problems, Parmenides shows that in this 
case (one Form being the same 1n all) would lsad one to 
think either that everything thinks or that there must 
be thoughts wh1ch are not thought--the latter being con-
tradictory and the former strange. David Keyt believes 
this argument to exhibit the 'fallacy of division's "It 
is as bad .as arguing that since Forms are intelligible 
entities ••• and things share 1n Forms, each thing 
1s an intelligible ent1ty,"23 However, fallacy or not, 
the suggestion of Forms as thoughts (as long as Forms 
are taken as being separate)--'th1nk1ng a thought'--
coUld run into the same difficulties as 'seeing a look.' 
.Next Socrates suggests that Forms are patterns in · 
reality and that particulars are likenesses of them, 
Parmen1des wonders if the Forms would not in turn be like 
- -
their copies, that is, would not the Form and its copies 
have the same character? If this 1s so and if one further 
takes 'being like' as 'partaking of one and the same 
form' then an infinite regress occurs. (This argument is 
closest to Aristotle's Third Ma~.) 
Finally Parmenides shows that 1f the Forms a.re 
· steadfastly separate from particulars then there 1s no 
certain Y..nowledge of the Fol"lils, nor can there be. He 
shows that particular slaves, for example, are relative to 
iv 
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still -agree, a)Forms must exist--lest we have nothing 
upon which to fix our thoughts, and b) ':partaking of' 
must be explained in some other way--for as long as 'the 
gap remains, little or no sense 1s made of the notion. 
(One might , then, be led to believe that at least another 
at·tempt will be forthcoming. ) 
Beginning at 1J5C the teacher tells the student 
that he must go through a preliminary exercise, a difficult 
one. The exercise . consists in taking a notion, drawing 
all . that . can be drawn from it and then taking the contrary 
of that not.ion and all that follows from it. After such 
a ritual the student will be more apt at definition. 
The exercise will show that there is a 'logic' to be 
discovered in the realm of Forms, that what .the young 
Socrates • originally hinted would constitute a paradox (One 
being Many, etc.) is, once again, only a paradox of appear-
ances--a. certain peculiarity of our language (as will be 
further expanded upon with reference to toher dialogues 
lat~r}. Parmen1des 1s begged to give an example of such 
an exercise and Aristoteles (Ar1stote's nsmesake?--being 
less troublesome .and even more inexperienced than the 
SJ. 
an,: entity in each of the Hypotheses (simultaneousiy 
'The One, 1 any speolf1o •Form,' eny •spec1f1c 'ar-
ticular') .-24 Such a notion hardly fits with what is 
actully found in the Hypotheses; that 1s at times only 
'The One' can be meant, at others £_nly a 'Form' oan be 
meant, and at st111 other times a 'particular' must be 
what 1s being referred to. Hans Rochol contends that 
the 'one' is taken throughout strictly _ as meaning 1n-
div1dua.l Forms, saying, "In short, 1n the second pa.rt 
of the dialogue the Idea 1s exclusively called the One 
for the same reason that the whole dialogue is called 
the Parmenides", s1nce Parmen1des is dealing with in-
_d1 vid .ual Forms 1n the first part, he must be dealing 
with . them in the second. 25 Again, I find little credence 
in this theory for reasons given above (and will be 
shown further 1n Chapter III). Cornford, on the other 
hand, does allow for a sh1ft in meaning of the 'one' and 
comes closer to my 1nterpretat1on. 26 I tend to summarize 
the Hypotheses in this waya I. Assuming 'One' there is 
no 1nte111gib1 .11ty, the 'one' is without 'predicates' and 
being. II. Assuming 'One~• there is intelligibility, 
the One 1s with infinite ~predicates'; Forms combine and 
are generated in certain ~eys beir.g 1ntelligibler particu-
lars _become intelligible. III. Assuming •one is' as a 
whole of parts, others are a plurality of other'ones'--
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others , being Forms and part1ouls.rs made intelligible. 
IV. Assuming 'One' others are not a plurality of 'ones' 
and therefore unintelligible. v. Assuming a 'one-entity 
- . . . 
as non~existent' such a unity (particular) is intelligible 
and has the possibility of becoming. VL. Assuming the 
'One as non~entity• there is no 1ntell1g1b111ty, nothing.-
VII. Assuming the 'One as non-existent' (having no 11m1t) 
then others (Forms) have only the appearance of limit, 
likeness, etc. VIII. Assuming the •one as non-entity• 
others will be nothing, having not even the appearance 
of anything. Or, of all eight Hypotheses, 1n short, The 
Many causes the One to be intelligible, the One causes -.·-
the Many to be intelligible. One without many is nothings 
many without one 1s nothing, That the One cannot be 
without the Many and the Many cannot be without the One 
is not a contradiction or a silly notion, that 1s just how 
it is in reality. Now, having shown the context in which 
the Third Man argument appears, we are resdy to discuss the 
'third man' himself (providing we can agree on just where 
he 1s), 
The Third Man Argument Itself 
All commentators agree that the Third Man 1s found 
in the Parmenid~. As we have alrea.dy seen in Chapter I, 
Turnbull found what I have called the 'seconde Third Man 
. ;3 
1mpl1ed at lJOA-lJOE. But what about the 'th1rd'Th1rd 
Man? Problems, as stated earlier, -prevail. Where 1s it 
and 1n how many forms? Some commentators (Francis Corn-
. ford and Mare Cohen) 27 find 1t at 1J2A-B, although 
Gregory Vlastos and Colin Strang 28 recognise 1J2D-13JA. 
as a ve~s1on of it (but 1n no important respect) • . Taylor 
.seeing it twice, thinks the former is against participation, 
the latter against copying. 29 And, finally, where most 
think it is (1J2A-B), Turnbull thinks it isn't, he thinks 
that 1t does not really appear until the passage at 132D-
1JJA.JO And last, and least, it should be mentioned that 
P. T. Geach . has a version found nowhere 1n the Par menides.3 1 
Since Taylor arid Turnbull go to considerable . length to 
show their points perhaps these should be considered 
before · ventur1.ng on. And al though in the er 1d I shall 
agree with the latterg the symbolism used by the others 
(save raylor who uses none and Geach who eloquently avoids 
• any passage : 1n the dialogue), on the passage at 132A-B 
will pretty , much do for the passage at 13JA. But the 
differ ence between 132A~B and lJJA 1s at least somewhat 
si tn1f1ca..'1t as Turnbull shows. 32 
The Precise Location of the TMA 
According to Taylor the Third Man Argument is fou.~d 
at 1J2A-B a.nd at 132D-13JA, he finds both hinging on the 
relation of particulars to the Forms. However, the latter 
argument deals specifically with the ~...QN Theory (that 
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particulars are copies of .Perms) opposed to the first 
that deals with 'part1c -1pation' in general.:3J In the first 
argument 1t 1s assumed that there 1s only one reason for 
believing in the Forms and that is the fact that several 
things we perceive have some common character, there is 
one Form which they ell participate in or partake of. 
Now Parmenides does a curious thing, he as~umes that the 
character (Form) itself possesses its own character 
(Largeness 1s Large), making it a th1?IB (a substance 
capable of having predicates 1n Aristotle's terminology, 
and here Taylor accepts Aristotle's cr1t1c1sm--whereas 
I do not in Chapt~r I). Then he asks if it would not be 
.right to say that these two things (particular and Form) 
have something in common. That which they have in common 
surely .cannot be one or the other, hence, 1t must .be some 
_third character, Form Largeness 1 , :3-4 and it must appear 
large along wl th the ps .rt1cular and Form Largeness 1m-
ply1ng . st1ll another Form Largeness and so for.th.35 It 
is with the translation of this argument that Turnbull 
disagrees. The two agree on what the argument at 132D-
133A is designed to meet, that is, it shows the problems 
involved when partioulars are taken as cop1e~ of Forms 
and 1f 'likeness' works both ways and if it is by virtue 
of some Form that things are alike~ then a regress ensues, 
(Taylor tries to avoid this 'third man' by insisting 
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the relationship 1s ~symmetrical,..; but this will not 
provide an escape as I intend to sho ·w in the next chaoter). · 
Turnbull agrees with Taylor that th1s is the Third Man 
Argument and very near the one Aristotle presents. The 
former (Parmenldes 132A-B) cannot be because there is not 
even a first man. 
-Turnbull finds the argument at 1J2B-C as that showing 
what happens when the notion of 'Form' ts taken too 
11 terally-. . Turnbull translates the passage leaving i _n 
the s1gnif1cant Greek terms, 
Parmen1des I think that your reason for thinking 
each form (eidos) to be one 1s this. When many 
· seem to you tobe large, there seems to you, as 
you look at ( 1.donti) them all, some one form 
(idea) which -rs-seif-same; hence you think that 
there 1s one Large. 
Socrates That's true. 
Parmet1ides If, in your mir1d • s eye, you look at 
(1deisJ the Large itself and the other larges--
all of them--in the same way, will riot yet another 
large appear to be one, a Large which ls required 
for all of these to appear to be large? 
Socrates So it seems. 
f~pme~J~es Thus another form (eidos) of Largeness 
will appear, having come to be slonside the Large 
itself and those that partake of it. And then 
another along with all of these by which all of 
these will be large. So each of your forms 
· (eidon) will b~ by no means one, but unlimited 
in multitude.J, 
Turnbull describes the Greek words for Form in the 
following ways 
The Greek words are 'eidos' and'1dea•, both 
derivatives from a verb whose second aorist 
infin i tive 1s '1de1.n' and whose first person 
.singular present 1ndicat1 ve 1s 'ei _do'. By 
,,. 
,:.5 
.I 
Plato's time the verb had no employment in its 
present tense. But its emr1cy-ed forms a.dm1t of 
a double meaning, !11 the s 13Co!1d aorist, 1 t has 
the meaning of 'see• or 'look ct'. In the per-
fect 1t ha _s the meaning of 'know' (possibly from 
the commonplace that what one has seen he knows). 
".Idea•, of course• de:ri ves from • 1dein •, and 
its common or, if you please, literal meaning 1s 
'look' or 'appearance•, as in the phrase 'the 
look (appearance) of a thing'. ''§1.dos' derives 
from • eido' ' . and 1 ts commo:o.8mee.ni~g 1s 'that which 1s seen' or 'shape•. J · , 
The passage .at 1J2A-B can be understood 1n the sense that 
'look' also -appe .ars in English with a double meanings 
that is, it acts as both a verb ( 0 Look at that:") and 
as a noun (Turnbull's exa~ple be1nga "You should have 
seen the look on his face."} In some sense, then, a 
'look' can be seen. The trouble 1s that the 'look' does 
not exist apart from that which has the look. 39 And 1.f 
Forms are separate, then there will be an infinite regress. 
Aristotle's argum.ent deals with 'vis1bles• or 'particulars' 
and it is because there are two th1n__gs (Form and particu-
lar) that a ,further character 1s needed. In this case 
one ha~ a Ferm and a character appearing in the argument 
(large). Further, Aristotle nowhere says to 'look 1n 
40 your mind's eye.• If 'look' were not introduced into 
this particular argument at 132A-B, there would be no 
need for a • th1 rd ma.vi. • 
What the two arguments do have in common, of course, 
1s the introduction or assumption of some sort of 'selr-
predica.tion' and an infinite regress. And although the 
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former argument ~1ght be called a Third Man Argument, 
the latter 1s more deserving of that name. With that 
point granted, le t us proceed to formalizing the argu-
ment so as to determine its valid .tty. 
Validity of the TMA 
Ever since the year 1954 when Gregory Vlastos . intro-
duced h1s step 1n ·formal!zing the Third Man Argument as 
it appears in th e .Parmen1des showing 1 t to be formally a 
41 
non-sequitur, even more commentators have become inter-
ested 1n the arg unrent pronouncing upon 1t alternations 
of various sorts. There had always been some question 
as to whether or no t the argument was indeed inv al id, 
but the amb1gu1 ty was usually reso ;l \f,;::d by attempting to 
see if Plato revi se d or rejected h1. · · Jheory (if he did, 
the argument was valid1 1f he did not , the argument was 
not valid). The •modern way• of dealing with arguments 
1s to put them 1n ·symbolic form a."l.d then by a host of 
rules determinine whether that which is shown following 
from the premisse s actually should. Vlastos was, appar-
ently, the first to perform such an operation of the 
Third Man (dealin g mostly with the passage at 1J2A-B 
although recogniz in g, symbolically at least, the parallel 
of it in the pas sag e at 132D-13JA). The argument 1s 
valid formally on l.y if cert'ain 'suppressed premisses' 
come to the surf ace and Vlastos proceeded to show just 
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what those were. Opening the door to symbolic representa-
tion and bringing ln justification of something called 
•self-predication,' Wilfrid Selle.rs _, Colin Strang, and 
Marc Cohen42 (and to a less extent still others} attempted 
the modern way with the TMA, trying to improve upon 
Vlastos' step toward formulation. Since it was Vlastos 
who started it all, I shall attend to him first. Vlastos 
gives the first step at 1J2A 1n this way, 
(Al) If a number of things, a, b, c, are 
all F, there must be a single Form F-ness, 
in vi _rtue of which we _apprehend a, b, c, as . 
all F.43 
('F' 1s taken to stand for any discernible character or 
property,) The next step 1s this, 
(-A2) -If a, b, c, and F-ness are all F, there 
must be another Form, F-ness 1 , 1n virtue of ;.~a~h we apprehend a, b, c, and F-ness as all 
The conclusion (A2) asserts somethj,ng more than what is 
found in the first step (Al)1 namely, that F-ness itself 
1s among those things which have the property, F. 
Vlastos conjectures that Plato must have been 
thinking of something more than the steps he gives, since 
Socrates does seem to take the argument seriously. Vlastos 
looks for suppressed premisses and credits the first one 
he finds to Taylor, although he believes Taylor never 
drew out a.11 of 1 t .s implications. This secret premiss 
· Vla.stos calls the 1 Self-Predication Assumption' a 
(SP) Any Form can be predtca.ted of itself. 
Largeness is itself large. F-ness 1s itself 
F.45 . 
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,Vlastos suggests that Plato came vsry close to stating this 
.1n the passage when he said "Will not a single largeness 
appear once again, 1n virtue of which all these ('Large-
ness and the other large things') appear large?" (Pa~-
.ides 132A). This seems to indicate that Largeness itself 
appears large. 46 Spiro Panagiotou, in commenting .on 
.Vlastos' interpretation, goes so far as to say that 
'viewing' itself entails the notion of self-predication, 
that Vlastos did not need to go off looking for some other 
textual evidence of it (as he does do)~ 47 The premiss 
alone, however, 1s still not enough to yield the needed 
result so Vlastos seeks next to justify the consequent of 
; (A2) coming up with what he calls the 'Non-Identity 
Assumption' 1 
(NI) If anything has~ certain char ac ter, it 
.cannot be identical with the Form in virtue 
of which we apprehend that character. rt 8x is F, x cannot be identical with F-ness.~ 
Simply put, if the largeness of a thing is not identical 
with that things, then if Largeness is large, its large- . 
ness also cannot be identtcal with Largeness. The two . 
additions are inconsistent with each other and it . is just 
for that reason we can generate a.."ly ·c.onclusion we 11.ke. 
Peter Geach goes so far as to say th8,t the two are contra-
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d1ctory, "For no Fis (identical with) F-ness' 1s 
equivalent to 'F-ness is no F,' which is the direct 
contra.diction of 'F-ness 1s itself an P. 11149 (It is, of 
course, necessary to be able to substitute a Form for . x 
1n any case.) This further leads Vlastos to believe that 
Plato could never have been aware of what these premisses 
were _for he· 1s not the sort of philosopher to present 
an argument with inconsistent premisses leading to a 
trifling conclusion.5° Vlastos does think, however, 
that these two premisses are just throe ·necessary to 
to bring on the regress. But are they? If (SP) and (NI) 
are ac~ually required then the conclusion must be log1- · 
cally inconsistent, but it 1s not. But as Marc :Cohen 
sees (and no doubt ·others have seen) the conclusion 
should be understood to be the contradictory ·of the notion 
of the Forms cited at 132A, that 1s, it should reads 
"And so there will no longer be one Form for you in each 
case, but 1nf:1nltely many. 1151 The results no inconsis-
tency. An inconsistent premiss set is not necessary for 
the conclusion. 
The above being the case, Sellars, Strang, and 
Cohen ha.Ye attempted to formulate the argument with a 
consistent set of premisses. Sellars, perhaps, 1s next 
in line. First of all Sellars does not think that (SP) 
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and (NI) necessarily need to be taken as contrad1ctor1es 52 
and further points out a problem w1th the expression of 
!, ~ :. ~ 
'F-ness' in Vlastos' formulation of the argument. There 
seem to be two syntactic categories (and a combination of 
the two) to which we could possibly assign expressions 
which come about from 'F-ness' when 'F' 1s replaced by 
one of its substituends, these beings 
(1) a representative symbol or name--the proper name of a 
Form, 'Largeness,• for example, or 
(2) a variable proper allowing us to quantify 1n respect 
to the substituends for F-ness. "For all Largenesses 
• • • " etc, or 
(J) a combination of l'lmodes of variability" and "represen-
tative variablesff--wh1ch means 'F-ness' stands 1n 
place of not a class or mere names of simple Forms, 
but a class of variables. 
It ls the latter view that Sellars takes, finding that . 
Vlastos errs in his use of (SP) and {NI) by allowing free 
occurrences of the ste;nd-in variable !F-ness,• 53 The 
remedy, it seems, 1s to add quantifiers a~d Sellars does1 
(SP') 
(NI• ·) 
All F-nesses are F. 
If x 1s F, then x 1s not identical w1tb4 the F-ness by virtue of which it 1s F.:J 
But, now, to make the argument comJ?.1,e_t~, Sellars a.dds two 
further premissess 
(G) If a number of entities are all F, there 
must be an F-ness by virtue of whi.ch they 
are all F. 
are F.55 (P) 
~-b, .£, etc., particulars, 
So now fresh for ms can be generated by a consistent set 
of premisses1 (P) gives the supply of particulars and 
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(G) provides the generation of a Form by virtue of which 
they are all called F. (NI') tells us that none of the 
Fs 1n the group 1s identical with the Form (G) has 
generated, and (SP') tells us that the Form just now 
generated is also an F~ and this goes on forever. 
Marc Cohen ·r1nds that there is a problem with Sellar' s 
(NI') because it will not generate the regress allowed for 
at 132B. Sellars'formulation seems to imply the.t _F-ness 2 
can never cover any of the particulars that F-nessl does. 
Cohen suggests it might be better put this ways 
(NI2) if xis F, then xis not identical with 
any of thg F-nesses by virtue of which 
it 1s F.5 
In 19 55 Vlastos gave a re _ply to Sellars claiming th a t 
subst1tuends for 'F-ness' are not properly variables but 
rather proper names of the Forms, which means that the 
premisses are in fact only (SP) and (NI) forming an in-
consistent set.57 In 1969 Vlastos admitted that he would 
be more impressed with a consistent set of premisses 
rather than an inconsistent set but that Sellars' formu-
lation simply did not fit the text. Sellars' (G) implies 
that there 1s at least one Form corresponding to a given 
thing, when throughout the dialogue Plato means it to be 
exactly one. It is only in this way that the uniqueness 
thesis can be denied. Vlastos changes Sellars' (G) to 
6J 
If a number of entities are all F, there 
must be exactly one Form corresponding 
t o the ch aract er , Ft and each of those 
entities ls F by virtue of participating 
1n thet Form.58 · 
By adding t his (Gl) to his own slightly reformulated (Al) 
and (A2) Vla.$rt'o.s (in 1969) finds an inconsistent triad. 
A similar no t ion had been put forth by Anders Wedberg 
some fourtee n years earlier, 
(1) 
(11) 
(111) 
A ·thing is Y if and only if it participates 
1n the Idea of Y-ness. 
.An Idea. is never one among the objects 
participating therein. 59 The Idea of Y-ness is a Y. 
Wedberg's (11 ) ls similar to Vla.stos' (NI) and elthough 
(11) and (11 1) are not inconsistent, when added to (1) 
which is nec es sary, the three do form an inconsistent 
set. 
Colin S trang 1s another comments.tor eager to make 
the set of' pr emisses needed for the TMA a con s istent set. 
He, like sei ia rs, looks for the answer in the shift of . 
meaning of •o ne.• His argument is thisa 
1. Let there be several (a set of) A's; 
ca11 them Set I. 
ASSUMPTION, (OM) Given a set of A's, they 
participate in one and the 
same F (A). 
2. By OM, the A's of Set I participate in one 
. and the same F (A) ; ca.11 it F1 (A). 
3. The re 1s one and only one F (A). 
CALL THIS (U) s hort for th e Uniqueness Thesis 
ASSUMPTION, (SP) F1 (A) 1s an A. ASSUMPTION 1 (NI} Fl (A) 1s not a member of Set I. 
4, By SP and . NI, the A's of Set I together with 
F1( A) form a new set of A's1 call 1t Set 2. 
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5. By OM, the A's of Set 2 part1c1pate in one 
and the same F(A); call 1 t F 2 (A). ASSUMPTION a · (S P) Fi(A) 1~ an : A~ 
ASSUMPTION& (NI) F~ 1s not a member of Set 2. 
6. By NI, F2(A) 1s another F(A). 
?, Moves 4-5 may be repeated again, and indeed 
indefinitely. 
8. There f ore there are an infinite number of F(A)'s. 
9. Therefore not-U • 
. Strang then draws out two further 1mpl1cations1 
10. But U (1.e., not-not-U) 60 
11, Therefore either not-OM or not-SP or not-NI. 
Strang points out, 1n the passing, that although one needs 
to work to surface the (SP) in the version of the argument 
at 132A-B, (SP) is less concealed and plays a more promin ~ 
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ent role in the argument at 132D-lJJA. Th1s is true and 
it makes me think how much simpler it would have been for 
Vlastos had h e considered that argument for his exercise 
as his prime · 1nterest--but, aga1n, the two a.re very close, 
Strang•s argument, above, 1s somewhat aµpealing but 
again .shifts between what Strang calls the (strong OM) and 
the (weak OM). This does not seem to be warranted by the 
text and Marc Cohen brings an alternative which would allow 
for a consist ent set of premisses and the same sense of 
(OM)throughout. If it works, and I thin 1c it does, Cohen's 
formulation ha s more merit • 
. Cohen begins his search for the most desirable 
formu.lation (g_uas1-formul&t1on -- no commentator has put 
the argument 1n strict symbolic form) of the Third Man 
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'by attempting to revise Sellars• (G) which wasa If a 
number of entities are all F, there must be an F-ness 
by virtue of which they are all F • . And, of course, Vlastos 
had changed it to (Gl)1 If a number of entities are all 
F, there must be exactly one Form corresponding to the 
character, F; and each of those entities is F by virtue 
of participating in that Form. Vlastos (Gl) is r~jected 
in hopes of stating (G) such that no inconsistency would 
appear in the premisses, Cohen makes a number of attempts 
(too numerous to consider here) to find just the right 
(G) when he finally decides that some definitions would 
be 1n order. 
(Dl) 
(D2) 
(D3) 
(D4) 
(D?) 
· (D8) 
And those, I think, should be glvena 
An objec~ 1s anything of which 'F' can be 
predicated. 
A particular is an object in which nothing 
(can?) participates. 
A Form is nn object that ls not a particular. 
An object 1s an object of level one if 
(a) All of its participants -·are of level n-1 
or lower, and 
(b) All objects of level n-1 or lower 
participate in it. 
A set of objects is a set of level n if it 
contains an object of level n and no higher-
level object. 
A set of level n will be said to be a maximal 
set if it contg;ns every object of level m 
for every m<n. · . 
To all of this Cohen adds an axiom and two theorems to . 
arrive at his best alternative for (G)a 
(OM-Axiom) For any maximal set there is exactly 
one Form 1n which all and only members 
of that set participate. 
(Tl) No object is on more than one level. 6J 
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The above he gets from (D6), (DB) and the {OM-Axiom). Now 
Cohen thinks he is ready to announce h1s (G), · which is, 
by the way (Gll) for him by this t1mea 
(Gll) For any set a, there is exactly one Form 
participated in by all and only members of 
the lowest-level m~~imal set which contains 
every member of a.6 
Still, · alas, there remains a problem, the Form generated 
cannot be said to be over, in the sense that we want it 
to bes that . is,~~~• What we have is a one over 
~• What we need is a form 1mmediatell over and not 
the set itself, but ea.ch of the members. This 1s the way 
Plato must have meant it. It 1s Cohen's (OM~Axiom) which 
contains the flaw and to revise it he needs even more 
definitions a 
(D9) x 1s over y =df y, or if y is a set, every 
member of y, participates in x.65 
But this makes the relation not a one-one !!2,! a one-many. 
So on toa 
(DlO) x 1s immediately over y =df xis over y 
and x 1s over all and only those sets whogg 
level is equal to or less than that of y. 
This means that while the over relation may be many-many, 
the immediately over relation 1s one-many (which is what 
we want). Cohen 1s ready for his revised Axiom, 
(ICM-Axiom) For any set of Fs, there is exactly 
one Form immediately over that set.67 
This, by the wey, 1s equivalent to (Gll) and entails the 
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(QM-Axiom). To this add one more theorem and Cohen 1s 
ready for his arguments 
(TJ) If xis immediately over Y, then the levgS 
of x 1s one greater than the level of y. 
The above theorem 1s derived from definitions 6-10. And 
now, at 
1. 
2. 
J. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
last, Cohen's final version of the TMAc 
Let A be any set of Fs (of level n). 
There is exactly one Form immediately over A, 
call it 'F-ness I'. (1), (ICM-Axiom) 
F-ness I 1s of level n + 1. (1), (2), (TJ} 
F-ness I 1s not a member of A. (1), { 3), (Tl), (D7) 
Av (F-nessI) 1s of level n +1. (1),(3),(D7) 
There 1s exactly one Form immediately over Av 
(F-ness I), call it 'F-ness II'. (5), (ICM-Axiom) 
F-ness II 1s of level n + 2. (5),(6),(TJ) 
F-ness II 1s not a member of 
. A -v (F-ness I) 
F-ness II# F-ness I 
• 
• 
• etc.69 
(5),(7),(Tl),(D7) 
( 8) 
This argument yields exactly one Form for the set under 
consideration at each stop, the (!OM-Axiom), revised from 
the (OM-Axiom), is consistent too with there being more 
than one Form over the set with which we start. Further, 
in this argument (SP) and (NI) do not come in a s bona fi de 
premisses--as 1s true also in the passage at Parmen1des 
132A-B ,. Instead (SP) is presupposed in the def1ni tions 
of 'Form' and 'object.• {Nn comes 1n as a consequence 
1n Ste,p (4) being an instance of the th eorem that a Form 
is not a member of the set 1t 1s over. 70 
Cohen's interpret a tion dir ects one's attenti on to 
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' ' 
the 'one-many• problem which persists 1n the J:_~!_menides. 
As Cohen says, . , • • • 1 t 1s the point of the TMA to show 
that the One-over-Many principle, far f~om supporting the 
Uniqueness thesis, leads to its den1al."?l What one must 
do, of course, is this, reject the •one-~-many• 
showing how the •one-many' is intelligible (as I interpret 
Parmen1des as doing 1n the second part of the Parmen1des). 
Let it suffice for now to say that the argument is valid. 
And since the argument (both versions in the •dialogue) 
involves •self-predication,• and the original-copy argu-
ment brings 1n Forms as 'paradlgns' and both versions deal 
with . •exemplification,' 1 t might be well in order to discuss 
each of these notions. 
Self-Predication 
Since Vlastos was first to bring the principle of 
Self-Predication to light, perhaps it is best to consider 
just what he has to say about it. First, however, I think 
it undoubted.ly true that 'self-predic at ion' does come into 
the Third Man Argument(s) of the Parmeni ~e s (Cohen's . ver-
sion coming closest to the passage). And if I am. correct 
1n th1nk1r...g that the argument is not against what . Plato 
really held, but rather the argument 1s used as a , d.1uretic 
to purge oth ers of the over-s1mpl1f1ed notions therein, 
then one should not find 'self-predication' elsewhere 1n 
Plato's worksa er, if it !!E.Eear~ to be there (as it must 
have r ·or anyone to assume 1 t), there must be some other 
explanation of' the language used. Vlastos himself does 
not think that Plato ever intended 'self-predication' 
(further, that he did not even recognize its existence 
1n the ·. Third Man, to which I find the contrary), however, 
he thinks it does appear to be 1!llplied by his Degrees-of-
Reality Theory and by his Copy-Theory, 
For if en .F particular is only 'def1 .c1ently' F, 
and only the corresponding Form is perfectly F, 
then F-ness 1s F. Or if the F particular 1s a 
copy of F-ness and resembles F-ness in res2ect 
of being F, then, once again, F-ness is F.72 
This is, of course, the way the copy theory is at least 
as presented 1n the Third Man at 132B-133A (and I think 
hardly . ev·1denc.e that Plato held 1 t). But Vlastos thinks 
also that various statements about particular Forms found 
throughout · Pla t o's -dialogues imply this assumption • . In 
the ~xsis (217D) Socrates says th~t whGn a man's hairs 
have turned whi te "They have become such as that which is 
present in them, white through Whiteness." This seems to 
imply, Vlastos thought, that the white hairs have the 
same quality that Whiteness itself does. Another example 
ms.y be taken from the Protagoras (J00C-D): Socrates says, 
"What other t hing _!:;..9u_ld be holy, if holiness isn't h ol y''---
1mply1ng tha t holiness 1s holy. Also in the Phaedo (l OOC) 
Socrates says, "If' anything else is beautiful, besi cl . 
Beauty its elf'• ~, and the Symposium certainly gives the 
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implication that Beauty is bea,utiful--:-more fair than any 
of 1 ts instances. Vla.s to s does a.d:ni "ti-. that not all Forms 
are open for 'self-predication•, for example, Change, 
Becoming, Perishing ·, and Moving. · To say that Change 
changes, Becoming becomes, Perishing perishes or that 
Movement moves clearly goes against what Plato means as 
Form in the first place, since Form are to be absolutely 
perfect being with no ehanges.73 If one could get rid 
of •self-predication' then the 'third man' would not 
arise, But lt appears that we ·do have 1t. 
Paradigmatism • 
. Much has been said about Forms as paradigms. Plato 
certainly does lmply that Forms do stand as archtypes 
as is clearly evident 1n the Cratylus (389B) where if 
a shuttle is broken, it 1s to the £l'.!'.!!! Shuttle that we 
look, not the broken particular, when we make another. 
Forms are presented as paradigms in the Republic at 
402c, 472C-D, 484C-D, 500E-501C, 510A-B, 520C, 540A, end 
in the Phaedrus at 250A-B, 251.A. and 1n the Timaeu s at 
29B-C, 37C-E, 39D-E, 48E-49A, 50c, 52C, 92c, and at 
numerous other passages throughout Plato's texts. 
To make some sense out of the above analogies have 
been drawn, the most popular one being the analogy of 
the Standard Pound, Gea ch uses 1t to show the relation 
of Forms to particulars. He says that the Standard Pound 
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must weigh a pound no matter what it weighs, whereas the 
particular pounds are wei ghed against the Standard Pound, 
more or less weighing a pound. The Standard Pound is not, 
however, weighted against itself. We say that the Stan-
dard Pound.!.! a pound or we1'ghs a pound analogously. Plato 
did not think of Forms as 'attributes' as the analogy 
should show, Forms are the standards to be meas_ured up to. 
Geach thinks too that 'self-predication' involved in the 
Form as standard 1s simply, once more, analogous to the 
predication we use of part1culars. 74 
Vlastos does not find much meaning 1n this word 
'e.rialogous ! and the Standard Pound "weighing a pound no 
matter what 1t weighs" (as Geach put .it) 1s misleading. 
We would be inclined to look for some further Standard 
Pound to weigh the first one against (a Third Man!Argu-
ment of sorts would occur).75 
Colin Strang, who by far has the most inter~st1ng 
account of paradigmat1sm, find -s that the TM.A 1n t~e 
Parmen1des carries along with it the notion of Forms as 
paradigms. He thinks that Plato was aware of self-
predication and further · 1r it goes, so too do Forms as 
archetypes. Strang defines a paradigm as that which has 
thG character perfectly, and this is certainly self~ 
pred1cationc If •self-predication' is rejected (as it 
must be since the TMA 1s a valid regress argument) there 
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1s nothing left of the For~ to serve as a standard of 
anything.76 Forms are invisible, however, so perhaps we 
should look for an invisible ·analogy, the Imperial 
Standard Yard (opposed to the Standard Yard which was 
once damaged and its replacement was constructed accord-
ing to its certified copies:) a 77 "it 1.§ the length the 
standard bar has under the conditions soecified. 1178 
- . 
But there remains a problem even with this. If Forms are 
invisible, how can particulars be copies resembling the 
Forms? (Further, as Strang points out, other problems 
arise with the Imperial Standard Yards it was not that 
looked to for the making of the Standard Yard, only 
· copies some years later, and it could be redefined or 
changed if the standard bar shrinks as it just possibly 
might.) 79 There simply does not seem to be any way to 
keep Forms as paradigms, if one makes the assumptions 
that Strang does. 
Exemplification. 
In the Third Man Argument in the Par menides Socrates 
is trying to find a meaningful way of explaining 'partaking 
of' --or the more comro.on way of putting it, 'being an in-
stance of.' Gilbert Ryle thinks that 'exempliflce ,tion' 
1s not to b e trusted Emd that further no sense can be made 
of 'being a.~ instance of.' To do this he presents an 
. 73. 
argument which leads to tm 1nfin1te regress showing that 
something mus·t be wrong with 'exemplification• itselr. 80 
His argument can be seen more clearly, I think, if we 
put 1t in th1 ,s ways 
.. (a 1s T) exemplifies E1 (two instances of exe~plifying 
S) Exemplification) . (b 1s e:xempl1f1es E1 
aa 1s T) exemplifies E i1 exemplifies E2 
- ~b 1s S) exemplifies EiJ exemp11!"1es E2 
fRa is T) exemplifies E1l exemplifies E2} exemplifies {[(b is S) exemplifies E11 exemplifies E2} exemplifies 
• 
• 
• eto. 
That 1s, if we take Exemplification as the Form over and 
above, say, Tallness, instead of Ta]ness once again 
E3 
E3 
(as it happens with Largeness 1n the TMA at Pa.rmenid es 
132A-B) we ~~111 will have an infinite regress--a . duplica-
tion of the sa.me Form. If this is so, Ryle concludes, it 
is illegitim a te to speak of •exemplific ation' at a11. 81 
Does th1s mean, then, that there is no possible w~y to 
avoid the 'third man'? 
We have shown that the TMA is logic ally valid, that 
it~ 1nvo1ve self-predio r.. . .£!!, that Forms as paradigms 
have fallenr, and now an arg ent that proposes to show 
that • bei,!lg .a n instance of' 1s Jmnoss1 bl e ., Look to 
Chapter III,. 
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ESCAPING THE THIRD MAN 
The Relation and the Related 
It 1s at 133D, if you recall, that Socrates suggests 
that Forms are reality and stand as patterns to part1cul~rs, 
particulars being likenesses of the Forms. Parmenides 
then asks if the Forms would not in turn be llke their 
copies. Socrates replies, "so it seems" and the regress 
ensues. (It happens in a similar way in the argument 
at 132B with 'looks of large:ness•--pe.rticular and Form--
being like some further • lo .ok' of largeness.) The ques-
tion isa m Forms 1Jke _their copies? 'Self-predication.• 
Forms as paradigms, and exemplification are all involved. 
Although Socrates 1s allowed to answer, "So it seems," 
what if we answer 'No•? What justification can there be 
(assuming that either Plato was not aware of any justifica-
tion, thus saving him, or assuming, as I do, he was)? 
. . 
Cornford, Taylor, and Chern1ss 1 stand as prime 
proponents of an •~symmetrical' relation holding between 
Forms and particulars. That 1s, as Proclus (Neo-Platon1st) 
put it t _ "the copy 1s a copy of 1 ts original, but the 
original is not a copy of the oopy.M 2 In other words, 
particular things are like each other in virtue of a Form, 
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but the Form cannot . be like . th em in the same manner. 
Taylor tries to make it more obvious with this examples 
My carte-de-vlste photograph and my living face 
may be , like one another, but the likeness 1s not 
such 'that it could be argued "This photograph is 
a likeness of you, ergo, by conversion, you are 
a likeness of it".3 
The example shOws that 'like' changes its meaning. 
Cherniss says that if 'like' 1s allowed to be taken the 
way 1 t 1.s in the Parmen1des, it proves "noth1 -ng can be 
a likeness of image of anything whatever" 4--wh1ch . woul.cl 
be absurd. Taklng the relation between particulars and 
Forms s.s asymmetr.1cal rather than symmetrical, Cornford, 
Chern1ss and Taylor ·hope to avoid the vicious regress of 
the TMA. But does this 'asymmetrical' relationship remove 
a.11 probl.e ms? I think not ( so too Vlastos, Rtmcima.n, 
c::) snd HardieJ, for to even admit that they are alike in 
!!}2:l sense is to 1nv1 te the regress. A copy and that of 
which it 1s the copy of are similar and similarity~ 
work both ways. 
R. E. Allen does have somewhat of a solution, -I 
think (as implied in Chapter I). He goee to his looking-
glass ana:_ shows tha t Plato 's metaphor does not even imply 
that the _Ee.rt1cula r :.:;. ,. e sernble the Forms. 6 E.ere Allen 
goes well beyond Ta y ~.or. He gives thia example, 
Consider the reflection of a red scarf in a 
mirror--a good example of what Plato u..l'lderstan.ds 
by an imitation. It 1s clee.rly false that the 
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reflection ls a scarf. Is it true that it is red? 
The reflection is riot similar ih kind to the 
original. Is it then similar in quality. ; If we 
say that it is, we face an evident embarrassments 
for to say this 1s to say that we can predicate of 
reflections, which are essentially adjectival, 
1n just the way we predicate of . their ori gina ls, 
things which exist in their own right. Scarves 
can be bou ght and sold, lost or stolen, wrapped 
around the neck in winter, but I would gladly 
give you every image that · has cross~d the surface 
of my mirror, and cou.rit myself no poorer for the 
loos.7 
Allen contends that it is all right to say that the image 
1s a scarf--to give the image that~' however, we mean 
something entirely different •when we speak of the image 
than when we speak of the real thing. The image depends 
entirely upon the existence of the real thing and the 
medium (the m1rro .r 1n this example--sp ace 1n Plato's 
metaphysics as shown 1n the Ttma.~us). And si nce there 
1s such a dependence (obviously the dependence is not the 
other way around:.-hea.vy dust could pre·vent my image from 
existing--and I would in no way be alterd), the image do~s 
not resemble reality, but rather it is a resemblance of 
_, . 
reality. 8 A reflection 1s a different 'sort' (cf. the 
·Sophist 240A-B} . 
Taylor's earlier example of his photograph~-although 
it does succeed in showing an asymmetrtcal relation--does 
not have the force and added signific an ce of the mirror 
example. My photograph, although it might be said to 
resemble me, does not continually depend upon me for its 
- BJ 
existence. I could have a heart tr~nsplant, plastic 
surgery and even die and rot away; st!ll, the picture 
might well r~main. Not so with Allen's looking-glass, 
the 1~age depends entirely upon me--1n a thr~e or more-
way mirror all of the images would depend upon me con-
tinuously and if I should vanish so _too would my resem-
blances (and they could vanish without me vanishing by 
interference of some sort). It is because of this ~ 0 
plete dependence that Allen chooses to call particulars 
resemblances of the Forms, which is something stronger 
and quite different from saying that particulars merely 
resemble the Forms. As Allen puts its 
·•Resemblances of' are quasi-substantial; relational 
entities, not relations. They stand to their 
- originals as the dependent to the independent, 
• as the less real to the more real. 9 
It is, as stated earlier, quite all right to call 
these relational entities by the same name as their Form 
but ,EFedic a tion as we understand. 1 t is not found in Pl a to. 
Vlastos has convicted Plato a bit hastily with his 'self-
predication' assumption. Plato's predic a tes are not what 
t.hey might appear to the uncritical eye. The 'F-1tself' 
might be called F but that does not imply that Fis indeed 
predicated of it. For proof of this he turns to the 
followings 
Phae do 102B2 
Each of the Forms exists, and the other things 
which come to have a share in them are named 
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after [the emphasis is Allen•aj them. 
Phaedo lOJE 
Not only 1s the Form itself always entitled to 
its own name, but also what 1s not the Form, but 
always has, when it exists, its immanent _ 
character. 
And from Ar1 stotle (although he do-es not grasp the s1g-
nU"1car1ce) 1 
Met. A 987BJ 
Sensible th1ngsJ - [Plato1 said, were all named after 
[Ideas] and 1n virtue of a relation to them; for 
the many existed by participation 1n the Ideas 
that~ the~~ as they. 
Allen wtshes to show that thes~ passages indicate 
that ' ••• is F' is not a common predicate but rather a 
'relntion,tl' or 'identifying' statement. · 'F • 1s really a 
'common name•--although not univ.22,~--the Form being 
designated as F and the particular instances being .£!!lled 
•p• by being named after the Form. slm1lar tc the way in 
which a boy is named after his father. •• •• 1s F' 1s 
actually systematically ambiguousi 1n its primary desig-
nation it is a synonym of 'the F-its ·elf' and 'F-ness' 
('F ... nes1:1 is F' states an indentity of the Form) 10 --s.nd in 
its derivative designation tt nam~s particulars indicating 
that they are causal:U:, deoendent upon~ F. Forms are 
~E.~~ cau s~ s of particulars, shari\ng no common attri- r 
bv.te 1"T.i th the Forms •11 F'o::.'ms are the substances I par-
ticulars are not substances with a.ttr1butea. Predic a tion 
is not what it seems. 
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In Vlastos' recent article "The Unity of the Virtues 
in the Protago~," aft er st~dying Plm~o•s passages which 
seem to predicate not only Just of Justice, but piety and 
the other virtues as well, Vlastos concludes that his 
· prime example of self-predication (Justice 1s just) fails 
to be so. 12 Part of the article is in response (partial) 
to Allen's article written some twelve years prior. He 
1s not, however, willing to grant that Allen is complet ·e1y 
correct; 1.e., that Justice 1s just is a statement of 
1dentity. 13 Instead, he concludes that the virtues are 
complementary and that when we have one of the virtues, 
the others are so similar we are likely to ha:ve them as 
well. "Justice is pious'' is example of what Vlastos now 
calls 'Pauline Predication• (dertved from St. Paul's, 
Charity suffereth long and 1s kind"--this 1s not intended 
of a form or universal but rather those who ha~ charity); 
14 that for once Plato 1s talking about groups of particulars. 
Vlastos contends that Plato orginally gave only 
three instances of the (SP) principles a) that of Justice 
(actually, also Holiness), b) tha.t of Beauty, and c) that 
of Whiteness. (a), of course, has been rejected and 
Vlastos goes on to reconsider the others in a footnote. 
He decides to reject .. Whit eness 1s white" as self-pred-
icative in the following instance {Llli..§. 217D7-El) re-
ferring back to his previous articles 
, the -white hairs are 'such as' or 'of the 
same quality as' Whiteness; they have the 
same quality that Whiteness has '.15 . 
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This last 'has' was only 'gratuitous' and should be 'is,' -
Hence, the statement is one of self-identity (at which 
point Allen would agree). However, Vlastos does not 
intend to give up self-predication completely. He still 
sees 1t as a necessary explanation of the:passage at 
Phaedo lOOC, "if anything else is beautiful, besides 
Beauty itself." 16 He expresses it this way, 
Hera the 'is' must express predication, not 
identity ••• the doct~ine that Beauty 1s 
(suprem -ely) beautiful is a clar and necessary 
consequence of the doctrine that Beauty 1s 
(supremely) loveworthy and that nothing is 
loveworthy unless 1t is beautiful, the identity, 
'the beautiful is the beautiful,' or 'Beauty is 
Beau.tyi• could not begin to capture this doc-
_trine. 7 
So Vlastos is only sl1ghtly -g1ve1ng in to Allen's inter-
pretation. But he does commend Allen's interpretation 
as, 
••• a splendid protest against ths imputation 
of (unrestricted) self-predication to Plato which 
I was sponsoring in my 1954 paper on the Th1rd -
Man, and which had be:ien blandly accepted by many 
others beside myself and appears to be widely 
accepted today.18 
As I have implied in my discussion of the Frotagora~ 
earlier (in Chapter I), I think that Vlastos' 'Pauline 
Predication' 1s analoguous to certain Forms actue ,lly 
combining. One could take such a passage as Vlastos 
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interprets it as evidence of Fo!"mS comb1n1ng, therefore 
allowing for certain possible resembl ances of them. 
There is, however, something important in what Vlastos 
says about the Form Beautiful. That is, Plato~ seem 
to be saying something more tan simply A is A. And· ·· · · 
an additional problem one might bring to Allen's notion 
of identity and relational designation 1s that Plato does 
sometimes confuse the two which would seem to imply that 
we could take F univocally. Keeping the notion th at things 
are · n:e.med after the · Fo::i:-ms, and that th e Form . holds the 
name properly and the particul a r holds it co mmonly,. 
1sn' t there just something more to 1 i<'lent1ty'' than Allen 
is telling us? I th1nlc there is, and. again, this brings 
in 'communion of Forms'; f 1.:i.rth~r, su ch st ate ments of 
identity ('F-ness is F') are applica ble to all Forms. 
An improvement upon Allen's notion of 'identity• 
might be this, when we say a man 1s wise we are not saying 
that he 1s perfectly wise of Wisdom itself, we ar e saying 
that he 1s mere or less wise with respect to the Formr he 
---
1s, as it were, a relational entity (a resemblance of Man) 
reflecting to some degree (yet deficiently) Wisdom. No 
matter how good his image was and no matter how much he 
was wise he still would not measure up to th e real Man or 
real Wisdom. He 1s not complete J:y what 1.t Fleans to be 
wise J that 1s, he may be a 11 ttle j tis t 9 a 11 ttle temperant, 
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but not courageous at all. He does not fit, nor no matter 
how hard he tries will he ever completely fit, or~' 
the definition of' Wisdom. Wisdom 1s not alone in the 
world of Forms; 1t combines with others, is what it 1s 
because of others,. Although Wisdom is what we .may fix 
our thought upon, ·more 1s involved. 19 Consider the 'gift 
of the gods' at Ph1 lebus 16D, 
• • · • we ought, · they said, whatever -it be 
that we are de aling with, to assume a single 
form and search for it, for we shall find it 
there contai ned; then, if we have laid hold 
of .that, we ·must · go on from one form to look 
: for two, if th e case admits of the.re being 
two, otherwise for three or some other number 
of forms. 
When we say, then ., that Wisdom 1s wise, oz- Justice is just, 
or Beauty is beautiful, etc., we are saying that it com-
bines with all th e other necessary Forms, and it does so 
wtthout qualifica t ion. "Beauty 1s beautiful" does not 
mean that Beauty ~r;ici,E,_,,at~s in !~self--nor that it has 
the attribut~ of Beauty, If anything, it has as 1ts 
essence a . certain combination of other Forms and the 
statement . "A 1s , " be,.ng far from a mere tat~tology, 
identifi~ the Form, re1nf(2!c1ng the notion that the Form 
is what it is fully (implying a combination of £_tJ~! 
Forms, ma.king this Form unique). Resemblances of the Forms 
are more or less d eficient in the n,umb~.! of Forms that make 
up the Form in qu:estion--end even if they were to partici-
pate in 2:1ery For m necessary, they still would~ a Form. 
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Not only 1s there 'degrees' in participation, but 
between Form and particular there is - difference in~• 
There is no doubt that Plato's language suggests self-
predications however, if this was on purpose, I can see 
nowh~re in the Platonic corpus where Plato makes~ 
of the notion. Quite to the contrary, I find him attempt-
ing to put an end to . it with the Third Man. 
'. Next 1 t would be 1n order to give some justification 
for Allen's notion of Forms as being 'exemplary' causes. 
Geach had some sort of a .similar notion when in his formu-
lation of the Third Man he writes, "There 1s a man from 
·whom all other men are descended 1120--'descended from' 
I 
bei ng the lo gical pa rallel of 'being made to be an F by 
the Form.' R. Robi nson and J. D. Denniston write of Plato1 
He leaves the relations between 'fo rms and 
thin gs somewhat vague; but the 'for ms' are 
-c er t ai r!l Y caus es of thin gs , both in th at ea.ch 
'form ~ causes the things named a.fter it and, 
appar en t lyp in that the 'form' of the Gcod 
.help s t o cau se all things. The relation of a 
'for m0 t n it s na mesake 1s repr es ent ed as that 
of o r i f'', t:·.a.l t o the copy, but also as that or :·what 
is f;h a :4·:d in t o what shares. 21 
Non, just w. _ , 1n Plato do commentators s.ctually find 
F'orms e.cti n " &s ca u ses'/ I might mention these several 
passa ges. 7..n the sixth book of the Rep~bl .~ ( 508) and in 
the seven t 1 book (157B) Pl ato sp eaks of the Form of the 
Good causi ng the other Forms (I also find 'One• causing 
the other Forms i n the second part of the Par menides which 
will be discussed a little later in this cha pter). At 
H1p-p1a.s Major 287C-D Platos ss.ys this 1 
Then th1s--I mean ·Just1ce--1s a certain 
.thing? 
Certainly. 
Then, too, . by Wisdom the wise are wise ar1d 
by the Good all good things good? 
Of course. 
And these are real things since otherwise 
: they would not do what they do. -
To be sure, they are real things. 
Then are not all beautiful things beautiful 
by the Beautiful? 
Yes, by the Beautiful. 
Which 1s the real thing? 
Yes, for what alternative is there? 
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Just how this causation works is indeed left vague and 
Plato was . no doubt aware of the problem when in the 
Phaedo at , lOOB he writes, 
Well, said Socrates, what I mean is this, and 
ther e is not hi ng new about it •••• As I am 
going to try to explain to you the . theory 
of causation which I have worked out for 
muself ••• I am assumin g the existence of 
absolute be au ty and goodness and magnitude 
and all the rest of them. 
And at lOOC1 
•• ~ It see ms to me that whatever else 1s 
beautiful ap art from absolute beauty is beautiful 
because it partakes of that absolu t e beauty, and 
· for no othe r reason. 
And at lOOD1 
••• I cling simply and straightfo r wardly and 
no doubt foo l ishly . to the expl ~nat 1on t ha t the 
on.e thing t ha t makes that obj ect beautiful is 
the pressen c e in it or association with it, in 
whateverw ay t he relation comes outr of absolute 
Beauty, ••• It 1s by Beauty th at bea utiful 
things are beautiful. 
And further at lOOE1 
Then it 1s also by largeness that large things 
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are large and, by smallness that smaller 
things are smaller. 
Again, the theory of causation given 1s not terribly in-
formative. V1astos, 1n his article "Reasons and Causes 
in the~." tries to derive some maan1ng from the 
above passages. He cites Eduard Zeller (,!211losoph1c der 
Griechen, II ·, 1, 5th . editions Leipzig, 1922) as finding 
__ ....__...Ar_ 
the Ideas to be the 'formal, efficient, and final causes 
all rolled into one." So too he lists }:>aul Shorey(~ 
Pl~t..9~-1£, Chicago, 1933) as uncovering a 'tautological 
logic' ln place of our usual notions of cause, Vlastos 
himself i.s in more agreement with the latter. 22 In the 
Phaedo at 95E Socrates starts on his discussion of cause. 
He 1s quite distressed that philosophers prior t .:, himself 
had sought only material and mechanical causes, whereas 
the teleological sense of causation 1s the more real (99B). 
Socrates then takes the •safe routec as shown in what was 
quoted from lOOD-E. Actually, according to Vlastos what 
Socrates gi-.res is not so much a ca.use b;ut a reason. It 1s 
also unin f ormative but it 1s meant to save us from having 
to look into trl~ial matters for causes. 23 Socrates goes 
on to g1 ve what Vlastos ce .11s the 'clever a1 t1a' 24 at 
103E2. . When asked ttWhy i s x F?" instead of naming one 
Form, Socrates suggests looking at a range of Forms--a11 · 
related ('communion of Forms' as shown in the Sophist). 
• 
.. 
. 
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· Vlastos concludes that 'Plato was seeking to explain 
physical laws with logical necessity. 25 This, now, 1s 
not altogether different from by justification that Plato 
did not actually hold to 'self-predication't that is, 
we have one Form before us, but then must go on to other 
Forms necessarily involved. 
It ·seems to me that what Socrates 1s suggesting at 
Phaedo 103E2 (and ear111er) 1s a sort of for maJ. cause--
which 1s not 1ncompat1.ble with the Timaeus (50C-D) and 
Allen's .'exe mplary' cause. Further, as fcrmal causes 
Socrates• des .ired . •teleological• cause could possibly 
enter in, Let me first quote the !,1mae.~ at 50C-D a 
But the forms (taken here as 'shap es ' or •struc-
tures, • I gather) which enter into and go out of 
her (s pa ce, the recept acle for the world of 
Becomi ng ) are the likenesses of eternal realities 
modeled after their patterns in a wonderf ul and 
myster i ous manner, which we will hereafter in-
vesti ga te. For the present we have only to con-
ceive of three na.turess first, that which is in 
process of ge neration, secondly, th at in which 
the generation takes place; and thirdly, that 
of which the thing generated ls a resemblance 
natura1ly produced. And we may li ken the 
receiving principle to a mother, and the source 
or spr ing to a father, and the intermediate nature 
to a child, and may remark furth er that if the 
model 1.s to take every variety of form, then the 
matter 1n which the model is fashioned will not 
be dul y prepared unless it 1s formless and free 
from the i mpress of any of those shapes which it 
. 1s her ea fter to receive from without. 
God (or the Demi-urge) is found in the Timaeus myth, apart 
from the Forms, using the Forms as patterns for his 
creat1on--space being a ready r eceptacle, God might be 
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thought of as being the original efficient cause of the 
sense world becoming as it is, The Forms are the _E!tterns 
he 'looked to' when giving structure in the world of 
becoming, In this sense the Forms are the formal cause 
(or reason for, if you wish) of structured existence, 
The Forms -appear as exemplars"."-more precisely1 they m 
exemplars; the god of the Timaeus used them as his models, 
and it sees that~ should look to them, attempting to 
imitate the divine order in our lives and in our creation 
of artifacts, To find out what a 'good man' is, for 
example, we fix our thoughts on the Forms Good and the 
Form Mani then we to on to other Forms to see what man 
is capable of having (what other Forms combine with Man) 
and what sort of goodness he can have (what other Forms 
comb1r1e wl th the Form Good that also combine with Form 
Man), and ha -ring a soul (which has experienced the Forms 
before--cf. Meno 80D, 81C, 85Ci Phaedo 65c, 75, 73A1 
Phaedrus 249C; ~epublic 524B-C, 526B) it is natural that 
we reach toward the divine design, Plato did not give 
this •teleological' extension 1n the T.1maeus, but in light 
of what he did say, one might make some sense of Socrates• 
holding the ·view that the teleological s ense of causation 
was somehow more real at Phaedo 99B, 
Now9 then, suppose we grant "Forms a.re causes," just 
how are w~ to take this statement. Assuming that my inter-
pretation of Forms combining with others is correct, 'cause' 
here would have the stand1 ·ng as a F'orm--a.nd rather than 
merely being .!22 addition. to the other Forms, it combines 
with eache Each unique Form has as part of its essence, 
Ca.use. Nowhere does Plato exactly say _ this--but it is 
implied if one takes particulars -as existing dependently 
on the Forms. 
Assuming the above to be true, we a.re saved from 
the regress of Ryle's argument against 'exemplifica.tion.•26 
If 'is' is taken as 'ca.use' and not the usual sense of 
•exemplification' we have no infinite regress. 
T (Tallness) causes a to be tall · { a depends on T) 
S(Shortness) causes-,!? to be short (b depends on S) 
What causes T and S to cause!! and .:e_? Nothing more than is 
within their na tures, It 1s the nature of T and S being 
unqualifiedl y what they are--exemplars--that they are 
combined wit h Ca.use. There is no •ca.use' lying outside 
to do some .rurther causing in this case. The particular 
stands as t he dependent to the independent -- perhaps 
getting clos er and closer to what it means to be short or 
tall, but ne·ve r being what it ~ to be short or tall. 
Particulars ar e not 1n the full sense 'being$' 
The Second Part of the 'Par men1des' 
-- .-,, ---
That some Forms ~ecessarliX, combine with others, 1s 
I think, fo n.."ld in the second part of the Parmenidese It 1s 
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in this section that Parmenides (Plato leads the young 
student through . an exercise that demonstrates that the 
Form Theory is not so simple as it might first appear. 
The 'one-many• exists in the rea.lm of the Forms as well as 
in the sense world and 'between' Forms and particulars. 
There 1s no real separation between the one and the many 
on ru1y level of existence although a 'onea (be it 'The One' 
or a specific F-orm, or a specific particular) 1s considered 
•unique.' Socrates -was right at Parmenides 129D to 
point out that there was no puzzle in whet Zeno was saying 
at the beg1nni .ng of the dialogue (127D I that if thir1gs 
are many they must be like and unlike). As Plato says 1n 
the Philebus (14.D-E) such an argument is 'commonplace' 
and 'childish.' However, 1t 1s the 'one-many' in the 
Forms that nee ds to be dealt with. Plato says at Philebus 
15B-C, 
Socrates, ••• But suppose you venture to take 
as your one such things as man, ox, the beautiful, 
the good; then you have the sort of unities that 
involve you in dispute if you give them your 
serious attention and subject them to division. 
Protarch u.s , What sort of dispute? 
Soc r atesr First, whether we ought to bel1eve in 
the re.al existence of monads of this sort; secondly, 
how we are to concei~e that each of them, being 
always one and the same and subject neither to 
generation nor dstruct1on, nevertheless is, to 
begin wi th , most assuredly this sin gle unity and 
yet subs equently comes to be in the infinite number 
of thin, 5-s that come into being--a.n ldentical un1 ty 
thus bei ng found simultaneously in unity and 
in plura. l. lty., Is it torn in pieces, or does the 
whole of it, and this wouJ.d seem the extreme of 
impossib i lity, get apart from itself? It is not 
> ' 
your g_uest1ons, Prota.rchus, but these questl.ons, 
where the one a-rid many s.re 6f another kind, the.t 
cause all manner of d1ssat1s fa ction if they are 
not properly settled, a.nd satisfaction if they 
are. 
It 1s 1n the eight Hypotheses in the second part of the 
Parmenides, I believe 0 that Plato attempts to settle 
the matter and on all levels of existence. In the Philebus 
he summarizes the main feature of the demonstration wit~ 
his four 1 kinds'1 the Limit, the Unl1m1t, the mixture, and 
the Cause. Again, I think, the moral of such an exercise 
is this; the 'one' 1s not not intelligible, nor can it 
~' without the 'many,' and_ the 'many' are not intelligible, 
nor can they~' without the 'one.' Row to the Hypotheses 
themselves. 
The first Hypothesis (137C-142A) shows ~1h~tt there 
would not be if just 'One' were assumed with no combination 
...- : . 
with other Forms--or with no 'predicates' in common every-
day lsngauage. A whole list of wh&t would not be for this 
•one5 follows from the singular notion itself. Here are 
some of the poss1bil1t1esa the one cannot be many, cannot 
bee whole of parts, has no limits, has f no extension or 
shape~ 1s nowhere (neither in itself nor in another), is 
neither 1n motion nor at rest, 1s not the same as, or 
different f'rom itself or another, is not like or unlike 
itself or another, 1s not equal or unequs.l to itself or to 
a.nothtn•, cannot be, or become, older or younger than, or 1:n 
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_t1me at, and tt cannot be named or in any way known. (A 
name must be a different' entity apart from that _ which has 
it--cf. the Sophist 24Lf•D.) If the 'One• taken by itself 
1s unintelligible and cannot be, we must then assume 
'One' in another way. 
The second Hypothesis (142B-15?B) 1s perhaps the 
most important of the eight for this thesis. Here it is 
shown what can happen 1f 'One ,!!,' -that ls, if one has 
being. In this case a whole host of possib111t1es arise. 
By assuming 'Onell' a whole series of different 'ones 1 
is generf:\,ted (numbers) and these 'ones' must also have being 
(so now what we call Forms, I gather), and 1n turn these 
can generate other distinct 'ones' (particulars). The 
entire gamut of reality is possible. Before explaining 
what this would be like, however, let us see exactly how 
it all begins. At 143A Parmenides (Plato) says, 
We a.re saying that the One has being, that 
is why it ls; and it was for that reason that 
a 'One which is' was seen to be a plural •ti y. 
As soon ?-S the 'One' has bein.5 0 1t is also a plu:-r-alt1y. 
That 1s, One partakes of Existence orr Existence causes 
the One • . The cause 1s different from its effect, there-
fore we now have three things, Existence or Being (cause), 
Di t·r ere nee ( other than) , and One (effect) --yet all are com-
bined. Now with those three, by a process of s.ddit1on and 
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mult1pl1cat1on we get unlimited numbers (of Forms) and 
each of these, in turn, 1S e ur11ty and the same process 
can be worked upon them to yield an unlimited plurality 
of other things (part1culars)--1nf1n1te numbers resulting 
from the process of generation must, you see, not only be 
•ones• but must have be1ng.(143D-144D). And to quote from 
144D1 
And unity, being one, cannot be in many places 
at once as a wholei And 1f not as a whole, it 
must be divided into parts, only so can it be 
present to all the parts of being at the same 
time. 
Further from 144E1 
••• for nothing that is lacks unity, and 
nothing that is ·~ lacks being. 
This shows that Being 1s an organic whole. Existence 
causes the One to exist, that One with Cause causes other 
Forms to exist, and these Forms, as uni tle a, cause par-
tioulars. Now with a process cf addition and multipli-
cation bec .oming becomes--the 'One is' being capable of 
coming to be (through particulars no doubt) many things 
with many characteristicse some of which are theses it 
can have extension and shape, can be both in itself and 
in another, can have motion and rest (unlike Forms, par-
ticula .rs are in something else O space, cf~ Ttmae~ 52A, 
and are the ever moving semblances of, er. Phaedo 83B), 
is the sa .me as and different from 1 tself and others, is 
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both like and unlike itself and others, 1s equal and un-
equal both to . itself and others, exists in Time, and is 
and 1s becoming, and is .not and 1s not becoming, has 
existence or becomes (the object of cognition and the 
subject of discourse as Forms), comes into existence and 
ceases to exist (the 'sudden' or 'instant' with particu-
lars). Unless one admits a sort of 'causal' connection 
. ( logical necess1 ty, if you wish), 'being' w111 not be 
known nor can it truly be said to be. Each specific 
Form~ combine with Being, Unity, . Difference and 
Sameness (at least) and each particular must be more or 
less capable of partaking of the above listed (extension, 
being in time, etc.). 
In Hypothesis III (157B-159B), because of the 
generation of unique different'ones' that was shown to 
take place 1n Hypothesis II, the 'One is' may now be 
assumed ns a •one-many' or a 'whole of parts.' Others 
are a plura.1.1ty of:·other 'ones' by pa.rticipa,tion in the 
'One which is,.' This Hypothesis, I believe, can be 
applied to al.l levels of being. And others can now 
be taken as a unity. 
ONE MANY 
The One - Other Forms 
On.e specific Form - Other likenesses (particulars) 
A particular llkeness - Other likenesses it has 
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Of the 'others' we may say this, they share in unity 
apart from the 'one' (if they were -not a unity or units 
therein, they would be nothing); abstracting their unity 
in thought leaves them unlimited, it is when the limit 
imposes itself on the unlimited that they are 'ones' (re-
member Philebus ·27B), all that was true of the 'One' 
itself (as being) ls true too of these 'ones' (Forms) as 
being (having contrary characters, etc.), they are both 
like and unlike themselves and one another, and the same 
for all others. 
Therefore, we do not have a share of the Form Unity 
.!.!! us--nor do we have the whole of Form Unity 111 us. We 
are, rather, ].imi ted by the Form. The Form C!D USE !S us 
(imposes upon us) specification. That is, the Form Man 
being a unity (combining with Form Unity) causes us to 
become~ man .. The Form Man defines what we are (in 
combination with Being, Unity, and a host of other Forms). 
In Hypot hesis IV (159B-160B) we find, if, on the 
contrary, we simply assume 'One• as we did in Hypothesis 
I, 'others' would have no unity as a whole of parts and 
would not eve n be a plurality of other 'ones' possessing 
contrary (dtf:ferent, distinct) characters. 
We must conclude, then, that the Onell• thet com-
munion of Po-rms 1s not only possible but necessary. The 
last four Hypo theses deal with the not-betng of particulars 
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and the possible non-being of 'One.' 
In Hypothesis V (160B-163B) we find that a~~ 
thing which 1s .!1£1 can be known--several cha,racteristics 
about this negative unity can be known. Something which 
1s not is that it is fil?.! (likeness) and 1s not what others 
are. Something which is not is not equal to others. It 
actually has a 'sort' of being, that is, we are saying 
somethi .ng when we say 1 t is not. Further this one thing 
that is not£.!!! possibly come into being (and 1f' it does, 
it can also pass out). Here we find that a 'one' (taken 
as a particular), although it is !121, something can be 
knotm about it. 
In Hypothesis VI (163B-164A) we assume the 'One' 
itself as non-being or as a non-entity. Here we find the 
'One' is equivalent to nothing; it cannot begin to exist 
or change, nor have any character, nor be distinct from 
anything, nor be the subject of discourse or the object 
of cognition. That is, whereas non-being is understandable 
in a narticular, it ls not of the 'One' itself. 
In Hypothesis VII {164B-165E) we assume there is 
no 'one' taken as limit (on any level, 'being' with 
'one')--in which case we would have only the ~pearance 
of limit, the !ll?Pearance of greatness, smallness and 
equa.11 ty, the appearance of likeness and . unlikeness, etc. 
In Hypothesis VIII (165E-166B) we assume no 'One'; 
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that is, not only would there be no~ but also no 
bei115. This would be com'Dlete negation. Others would 
be nothing, there would~ even be the appearance of 
'one' or 'many,' limit or unlimit. 
In conclusions the 'One' must~ (must combine with 
Being) and. by being it is also many (Forms). And ea.ch 
Form must~ (must combine with Being, Unity, Sameness 
and Difference and therefore also other Forms) and by 
betug and. being ~ 1 t 1s capabl~ of being ma.ny (par-
· ticulars in space and time). We ere net Not-Be1ng, nor 
completely Being, we are both, having a sort of adjec-
tival existence, and not really ~]~ate from the lillJqu~ 
Forms we parta.ke of. The Third Man, has I think, been 
a.nsweredo 'Self-predication' does not appear ln the 
second na.rt of the Pa.rmenidesi a necessary communion 
~ ------
of the Forms does. The Forms are not ~f:]28.I'at!:: from par-
ticulars, together they form wholes. Specific Forms 
are~ duplicate£• each Form is a unique one. One does 
not have an infinite regress of duplicate Forms, but 
rather a pro$ress of other Forms. 
The Essential Bed 
No treatise on the Third Man would be complete with-
out the Essential Bed. Many who have found few or no 
answers to the Third Man in the second part of the 
lOJ 
Parmenides ha.ve ta.ken a retreat to the Bed found in 
Plato's Republic (597C)s it has, in fact, been the most 
·popular escape. Vlastos hints at it, Harold Cherniss 
draws from it a denial of 'self-predication,• and Corn-
ford recognises it as a precise foreseen objection to 
the Third. Man.27 Here is that pa.ss~ge1 
Now God, whether because he so willed or 
because some compulsion was laid upon him 
not to make more than one couch 1n nature, 
so wrought and created one only, the couch 
. which really and in i tse1r .· 1s. But two or 
-more such were never created by God and never 
will come into being. 
How so? he said. 
Becausep said I, if he should make only two, 
there would again appear one of which th ey both 
would possess the for m or idea, and that would 
be the couch that r eally is in and of itself, 
and not the other .two. 
As Cornford says, "The F'orm, ·Bed, is not ~ bed, and 1 t 
is not true that it h2 the char acter 1n the same ws.y 
that individual beds have it. Rather it is the char-
-
act er, at"1d there 1s no ground for duplic.ating 1t O 1128 
By showing that the Form ..!J! the character and that it 
does n:.2,.t. !1~ the character, Cherniss emphasises, _ th~n 
')Q 
F-ness 1s not predicated of F.~ ✓ 
On th e ,ther hand, rest in such a Bed might not be 
so pleasant. 
d1fflcult1es. 
~o Strang and Cohen✓ see it leading to further 
Strang, for example, points out that the 
Form Bed in the a.bove passage is taken as a. paradigm. 
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It is that to which the carpenter looks when making his 
bed, and that to which the artist looks when ma.king his. 
If Chern1ss an d -Cornford are right, then, according to 
Strang, the Form Bed cannot be a paradigm. And further 
an 1nf1n1te re,gress of Beds could result 1f one says that 
1t 1s the cha ra cter which particulars have .~n_£ it is the 
paradigm of t ,hat character.3 1 Now, as for this regress, 
Strang 1s taking too 11 terally (as d.id the young Socrates) 
this notion o:f having a Form 1!! us. But Strang is not 
alone--so too do Cornford, Taylor and Cherniss. By say-
' ing (as Plato does not in the text, as I will show) that 
the Form ll th .a character other beds ~. we either c~.n 
have no degre e s of reality (something being more or less 
so and so) or we are back to the p:roblem of hav ing a whole 
or a share~ you. Cherniss and the others would never 
admit t,:, the latter so they must (unknowin gly) accept 
the former. If that is the case, the Form is what we 
have and. yet iWe a.re not paradigms and sup posed ly there. 
are Forms as paradigms. so. accepting all of that, Strang 
is :right, we, can take the Form that we have, add to it 
the Form as paradigm, and we are right back at the Third 
Man. Arguraent (only this time with beds). 
First o .f all 1 t should be pointed out that , the 
passage doe s _!!£! say that the Form 1s the cha ra ct er we 
have, and s ec ondly even if 011e could somehow draw such a 
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notion out of t b e passage, it should not be takken 
literally. If Cherniss, Taylor, and Cornford knew this 
they should have gone on to explain just .!,,hat they and 
Plato meant. As tt is we are thrown back to the problems 
in the first part of the Parmenides. Strang, of course, 
sees the proble m but not' the answer. He thinks that the 
Form Bed must aLso have the character Bed to be the 
paradigm that it is meant to be. And of course, that 
can lead to an infinite regress.3 2 
To resolve the problem put forth by Strang I think 
1 t is : 11ecessary ·to take particulars as being 'relational 
entities' (as A:l 1en does and further as they need to be 
as shown in the second part of the E!t.!m~u_ides), and 
adding the di stil'1ct ion between two sorts of r e lational 
entities (in th is case), namely, 'visibles' and 'imman-
ent characters. • Now, the Form Bed is not just a name--
nor is it a bar e entity. It ll a paradi gm, but how? When 
you get ·out of y our bed in the morning and look at it s.nd 
think how it co uld be a better bed, you do not say to 
yourself "that th ing ought to be more Bed!" period (I 
hope), Fixing your thought upon the Form Bed, you move 
on to other Fo:rms I Stability, Comfort, Neatness, Beauty, 
etc. These are the things that your bed is deficient in--
not in be ing a bed-- it already ll a very visible bed. What 
makes the Form. a paradigm 1s not that 1 t .t~ the bed that we 
1:06 
have (this is ambiguou s a:nd even if it is taken as 
meaning, the Form ll truly the Bed and we have less than 
perfect beds, deficiently the reRl Bed, nothing much is 
being said and infinite regress creeps 1n). Neither is 
the Form Bed a paradigm because it has a bed (although it 
like one .with all the abuse it has . been getting!}. The 
Form Bed is a paradigm precisely because 1.t fulfills .£2!-
pletely, without qualification, all that 1s necessary to 
be a bed, combining with all the necessary Forms. our 
beds are resemblances of the Form Bed reflecting imper-
fectly (or in some cases not at all) the other necessary 
Forms. What the passage 1n the~~£ shows 1s that if 
you have a Form Bed which is truly everything a bed can 
be, then th er e cannot be another identical to it; for that 
which 1s truly Bed has completely all that there is to 
have. If there were two beds they would have to sh e.re 
what it means to be bed, hence, •what it means to be bed' 
would be the~ Bed, the Form Bed, whereas the other 
two would have to be relational entities. Such a notion 
will put Marc Cohen to rest as well~ 
Cohen thinks that the Essential Bed contains a var-
mint because it does not establish the Uniqueness theiso 
All that it shows, he saysp is that there cannot be~ 
than one Form of Bed--not exactly one. Because, suppose 
we add the third Bed to the other two (TMA style) 1 we 
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would have an 1nf1n1te regress, and unless the argument 
could show how the regr ess can be -stop ped, it could not 
claim ~xactly one Form. Then, Cohen says, add that notion 
to the Third Man Argument and you have no forms at all! 
The Third Man shows that there is not exactly one Form 
{an infinite number) . and if the Third Bed shows that there 
1s not more than one--neither exactly one nor more than 
one--then none whatsoever. 33 This argument 1s, of course, 
sophistic. First of all 1t is based upon a misreading 
of the Republic passage and a mistmderstanding of Plato• s 
Theory. The Third Bed Argument does show that the Form 
must be unique (as demonstrated a'bove) and although the 
Third Me.n Argument is valid (as he very well shows), it 
1s not valid against what Plato really thought. So 1.t 
is .lli21 valid to a.d.d the two arguments together--and even 
if it were, this 'not exactly one' and 'not more than 
one' business 1s misleading, a mere _play on words. There 
1s rio real trap, Plato escapes. 
Why Socrates Didn't Esc!!I>~ 
Plato did not need to escape the Third Man; he he.d 
held the answer to such an argum ent lon g bef ore the farm~-
1des (Re oublic 597C, 476A, Prota p;or~1 }. ,~m -331B3 Euthyde mus 
301A; Phaedo 100D), but it was not un.t .... 1. the second part 
of the Parm enl des that he actually d~monstrated hou the 
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'one-many' ts to be ~aken and how 'participation' works. 
Plato does not change his Theory of Forms after the 
Parmenides (cf. Theaetetus 176E, 185D, 186A-B; Reoublic 
523-524; Sophist 249C-D, 253C-254A; Philebus 15A-B, 16C-E, 
58C-59D, 62A; Phaedrus 277A; ~ 965B-E; Timaeus 51B-52C; 
Seventh Letter 342D). The reason he put forth the Third 
Man Argument in the first part of the Parmenides and the 
reasori he demonstrated that it does not work in the 
second part 1s this, I thinks Plato did not have a ready-
made language for his Theory of Forms3 4 and using existing 
language~ confusing; those who had some acquaintance 
· with his theory tended to take it too literally and were 
unable to escape appearances. 
It is in the Cratylus_(likely written shortly after 
the 1:_~rmenides) that Plato deals most fully wtth th~ 
language problem. The general gist of the problem is this, 
names stand to things as representations and so ideally 
they should not be wholly arbritary but allowed to take on 
a natural resemblance; 1.e., of softness, hardness, 
quickness~ slowness, etc. Syllables should exhibit these, 
end whereas the same syllables need not be identical 
in all languages, essential resemblance and consistency 
is important. However, 1>re do nQ! ha.ve the ide~ language. 
There are sev e ral problemss 1) Our language being a copy 
1s naturally deficient. 35 2) The originators of l anguage 
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did not .see el ·early that wh1ch they were trying to 
imitate; they, being imperfect copies themselves, were 
likely t .oo far grounded 1n the world of flux. · Still, 
that which the y created does serve to spark some recol-
lection 1n us,.36 J) Language undergoes change due to 
pure euphory, people prefer a certain sound and there-
fore incorpor ·ate it into places where it does not belong; 
· consistency 1s lost.37 1.1-) Names can be completely arb-
ritary.38 Names, of course, are only a. step towards 
knowledge--the y ere instruments as sho~m at J88C. At 
"t . . 
Theaetet~ 177D-E, "Our aim is not to say the name, it 
1s to consider the thing named." Again this is echoed 
1n the ?Ophlst ( 218C) s 
At prese nt you and I have only the name in 
common with re gar d to this creature, and 
the thing to which we apply the name 1.s 
perhaps priva te to ea.ch of us, but we ought 
always to agree on the thing itself by means 
of logoi rather than on the name witho ut logs. 
This 'logos' is obviously the communion of the Forms--
what it ~~ t -o be something, a.:nd. our langu age does re-
flect . this s " ·Truth 1s not found :tn names but in sentences" 
(Sophist 263A-B). But as Plato s ays in h1s Seventh Letter, 
langua ge 1s weak {343Al)--that names and statements have 
a. "bad natur e~' (343D8). It is no wonder that people have 
trouble with Pla to's Forms-~the vone- ma.ny' problem as .well; 
as Plato say s in the Philebus {15D-E)s 
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we get this identity of the one and. the m~my 
cropping up everywhere as the result of the 
sentences we utter, in every single sentence 
ever uttered, in the past and in the present, 
there it is. Whe.t we are dealing with is a 
problem that will assuredly never cease to exist; 
this 1s not its first appeara~ce. Rather it 
is, in my view, something incidental to sentences 
themselves, never to pass, never to fade. 
And once one thinks he has a paradox of beings 
He has no mercy ·on his father or mother or 
anyone else listening to h1m-,;.a. lj_ttle more, 
and he would victimize even animals, as well 
as human beings in general, including foreigners, 
to whom of course he would never show mercy 
provided he could get hold of an interpreter. 
(Philebus 15E-16A) 
~- - ~ 
What sounds or appears to be a paradox--as a result of 
our language--is in fa.ct not, as shoim by the second pa.rt 
of the Pa.rmeni .d~. 
Socrates does not stop ParmenHtes in the Third Man 
- . 
Arguments (132 .A.-Bf 132D-133A) precisely because students 
very likely were not a.ware of the problems involved; 
Plato wanted to show the young members of the Academy just 
what ridtculous things could follow from their over-
11 teral 1.nterpretations e.nd their inability to escape 
appea.ra ,nces. And the Third Man is the prime example ( in 
its various forms)~ 
Once again ., Plato had nothing to fear from . any of 
the three 'i1hird Man Arguments; they arose out of' the 
failure to understand Ple1t<,' s theory=-and in turn, he 
used them. ( the 'second• and the 'thi~d') to help cl eE<.r 
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the way towards a better understa..~ding. 
Understanding, however, does .not come easily as 
Plato recognizes (having tangled 1-;ith it in the Theaetetus 
and the §02hist) in his Seventh Letter E~t 342B-Ds 
For everything that exists there are three 
classes of objects through which knowledge 
itself must come; the knowledge itself is a 
fourth, and we must put as a fifth entity the 
actual object of knowledge which is the true 
reality [Forms), We have then, first, a name, 
second, a description, third, an image, and fourth, 
a knowledge of the object •••• Of all these 
four, understanding approaches nearest in affinity 
and likeness to the fifth entity, while the others 
are more remote from it. 
Only~ people have a natural affinity with the Forms 
and even then these people are ripe for Plato's theory 
only if they are also intelligent and studious . (Sev ent h 
Letter J44A-B). Plato continues in this letter to 
show that 'recollection' still plays an important role 
in his philosophy1 
Hardly after practicin g detailed compa risons 
of names and definitions and visual and other 
s ens e pe rceptlons, after scrutinizing th em in 
benevo lent disputation by the use of question 
and ans wer wi thout jealousy. at last in a flash 
·of understanding of each blazes up, and the mind, 
as it exerts all its uower s to the limit of 
human capaci ty, 1s flooded with light, (344B-C3) 
'Insi ght ,' or irecollection,' or 'the soul seeing 
through herself' 1s nothing readily at hand. One must 
~. goin g beyond mere r1aming (as c.omrnunion of the For ms 
insists), beyond language (as criticised in the Craty!_£~_:) , 
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beyond the sense impressions (stepping here was the . error 
of · the Sophists as show'!l in the eri.stic dialogues}, and 
beyond reflection, gaining th~ right opinion of the rela-
tions of the Forms (where the Thea.etetus and §_ophist stop). 
Therefore, since our tools for coming to reality 
are defective, and we already being defective (being but 
r ·esemblances of the truly real), very few are capable of 
--
understanding reality--very few, if any, will be able to 
understand Plato. As he himself says in the Seventh 
Letter at 341C-Di 
One state ment at any rate I can make in regard 
to all who have written or who may write with 
a claim to knowledge of the subjects to which 
I devote royself--no matter how they pretend to 
have acqu i red it, whether from my in s truction 
or from ot h ers or by their own discovery. Such 
writers ca n in my opinion have no real acqu a in-
tance wit h the subject •••• Acquaint a nce 
with it must come rather after a long period of 
attendanc e on instruction in the subject itself 
and of close companionship, when suddenly, like 
a blaze k indled by a leaping spark, it 1s 
generate d in the soul and at once becomes 
self-sus t aining. 
Perhaps I too ha ve not come close; then again, perhaps I 
have. 
113 
Notes 
1Franc1s Cornford, Plato l\nd Parmenides, The L1bra .ry 
of Liberal Arts {New Yorks The .aobbs- Merrill Company, 
Inc., 1957), pp. 93-94; A. E, Taylor, Parm enides 1 Zeno 1 
and Socrates in Philosoohical Studies 1Freeport, New York, 
Books for Libraries Press, 1968), PPo 87-89; Harold 
Chern1ss, Aristotle's Criticis m-of Pl at o and ~~~ Acad~_,l 
(New York, Russell and Russell , 1962), PP• 374-J?5s 
2see Taylor, Parmen1des, Zeno, and Socrat~, p. 8?. 
3Taylor, Parmenides, Zeno, and Socr at e~, p. 87. 
4,, ' Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Platq, p. 375. 
5Gregory Vl a stos, "The Third Man Argument 1n the 
f_a.rmenides, 11 · in Studies in Plato• s Met e.uhysi cs, ed, by 
R, E. Alfen ( New York, The Humantties Press , "I 965), 
p. 242 1 Walter Garr ison Runcim s n, "Plato's Pa r menides, 11 
in Stu dies in Plato 's .. Met ap hysics. ed. by R~ E. A11e:1 
(New York:Th'e ~1fumanTt 1es Press;· 1965) e p. 319; 
w. R. F. Hardie, A Study in Pl at o (Oxford, The Clarendon 
Press, 1936), PPe-V0-97e 
6R. E .. Allen, "Parttc1pation and Predic a tion in 
Plat~•s Middle Dialogues," in St ud ies 1n Pl at o's Met a -
physi?~• ed. by R. E, Allen (New York: The Humanitfes 
Press, 1965), P• 50. 
?Allen, "Participation and Predication~ ti pp. 49-50. 
8 
.. Participation and Predic a tion," 50. Allen, p. 
9 Allen, .. Participation and Predic ~tion,u pp. 50-51. 
lOA"l 
..1. en, "Participation and Predication," pp. 46-4 ·7. 
11Allen, "Participation and Predic a tion, 11 pp. 58-59. 
12 Gre gory Vla.stos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the 
Prot ag or a s, 11 The Review of !~e~a:qt1YSi£.§_, XX (March, 1972), 
452-453. - . -
13v1astos, "The Unity of the Virtues," pp. 456-457. 
114 
14 Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues, tt - pp. 446-452. 
15 
452-45J, .Vlastos, "The Unit y of the Vi'rtu es," pp • 
... 
16 Vlastos, ttThe Unity of the Virtues, tt p. 452. 
17v1astos, "The Unity of the Virtues, It p. 456. 
18v1astos, 11The Unity of the Virtues, II p. 457. 
19r have come to to this interpretation quite inde-
pendently of Charles H. Kahn , whom I have recently dis-
covered as presenting something quite similar. Cf. 
"The Meanin g of 'Justice• and the Theory cf Forms," 
The Journnl of Philo~phy~ LXIX (October, 1972), 567-579, 
20Peter T. Geach, "The Third Man Again, " in Studies 
in Plato's Metaph_xsi cs. ed. by R. E. Allen (New York, 
The Humanities Press , 1965), p. 272, 
21Richard Robinson and J.D. Denniston, "Pl a to," in 
Plato I a Met~aphysl cs and Epist~lo r,i , ed. by Gregory 
Vlastos, Anchor Books ( Garden C 1ty, New Yorl{ 1 Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1971), P• 9, 
22v1astos, "Reason s nnd Ca.uses in the Phaeq_g," in 
flato I: Metaphysi~§.___§!.n~.E.,oiste.m_glo.,gr ed ~ by Gregory 
Vlastos, Anchor Books (Garden City 0 . New York, Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 132-133, 
23v1astos, "Reasons and Causes• 11 p. 1.56. 
24 VlastoB, "Rea.sons and Cau ses," p. 158 . 
25v1astos, "Reasons and Causes," p. 160, 
26 · See Chapter II of thts thests, pp. 75-76. 
27 · . 
Vla.stos, "The Third Man Argument in the Parmenide s," 
pp, 259-260; Cherniss, "The Relation of the Timaeus to 
Plato's Later Dialogues," in Studies in ?l a to7 s Meta-
£hysics9 ed. by R. E. Allen (New York1 The Humanities 
Pres s , 1965), p. 372; Cornford, Pl at o and Pa.rmenides , 
p. 90. 
?8 
- Cornford, Plato and. Ps r menid .es, p. 90, 
·-- ----- -
29
chern1ss, 11The Relation of the Timaeu~ _," P• 373 
115 
JOcolin Strang, ttPlato and the Third Man," in 
Plato Is MetA.nh:vsics ":nd Ep1.stemol ogy, ed. by Gregory 
Vlastos t Anchor Boo ks ( Gar denCTtY~ f-rew Yorks Doubleday 
· and Company, Inc., 1971), pp5 192-193; Marc Cohen, 
"The Logic of the Third Man," pa.per presented at a 
Symposium on Plato's Parmenides, Institute in Greek 
Philosophy and Science, Colorado College (July, 1970), 
PP, 21-22. 
31strang, 0 Plato and the Third Man," p. 193. 
32strang, "Plato and the Th1rd Man," Pe 199. 
J3cohen, "The Logic of the Third Man,' Po 21. 
4 . 
J See W1lfr1d Sellars, Vl asto s and 'The Third Man', 
1n f!111osoph i c~t Perspectives (Sp ringf'ield , riT . a 
Thomas 0 19671, pp. 4'.l, 47, 3:J. Sellars finds Plato 
hard-put to mold existing language to express his theory, 
as do I. 
35cra~vlus 4JOB, 4JlB-D, 4J4A. 
36cratylus 411c, 349C-D. 
37cr atyJ. us 414C-D. 
JSfwratylurl I.J.14D. 
116 
SOURCES CONSULTED 
Ac krill, J. L. "Plato and the Copula1 'Sophist' 251-
259.11 Studies in Plato's Meta;ehysics. Edited 
by R. E. Allen. New York, The Humanit ies Press, 
1965. 
Allen. R. E. "Participation and Predication in Plato's 
Middle Dialog ues," Studies in Plat o 9 s ~etaphysic s. 
Edited by R. E. Allen. New York, The Humanities 
Press, 196 5. 
Borges, Jorge Luis. Ava.rt ars of the Tortoise, Other 
l!!2J.isitions 1937-195 2. New York, v'la"shington 
Sq uar'e Pr -es s~ l 9bt>. 
Burnet, John. Greek _Ph~. losonhy_Thales to Plat,.2. 
London, Macmillan, 1955. 
Chern1ss, Harol d. 
the Academy • 
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and 
New Yor k, Russell and Russell, 1962. 
__ .....,,_ • "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of 
Ideas," fl.2-to Il Metaphysics_a!,1_q_~.!,~ln.2logy. 
Edited by Gregory Vlastos, Ancho: Books~ Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc,, 1971, 
... The Relation of the Ti maeus to Plato's Later 
---D-1-alogu es . It Studies ii'l Plato's Meta2.1!l.r;;1cs. Edited 
by R. E. Allen. New York , The Humanities Press, 
1965,. 
Cohen; Ma.re. "The Logic of the Third Man." Paper pre-
sented at a Symposium on Plato's Parmenides, 
Institut e in Greek Philosophy andScience;-colorado 
Coll ege, ,Tuly, 1960, 
Cornford, Fr an cis. Plato and Parmenides. The Library 
of Liberal Arts-:- New Yor-k: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Companyi Inc., 1957 • 
• Plat o's Theory of' Knowledge. The Library of 
_..,.L,.._1..,..beralAr ts. Ne;;-1York I TheBobbs-Merr1 11 Company, 
Inc., 1957. 
Geach, Peter T. "The Third Man Again. 11 Studies 1n 
Plato's ~etaphysics, Edited PY R. E, Allen. 
New York, The Humanities Pres ·s, 1965. 
117 
Hamilton, Edith, and Huntington, Cairns, editors. ~ 
- Collecte d Dialogues of Plato. New Yorks Pantheon 
Books, 1964. 
Hardie, w. F. R. A Study 1n Plato. Oxfords The Clarendon 
Press, 1936. 
Kahn, Charles H. - "The Meaning of 'Justice' and the Theory 
of Forms." The Journal of Philosophy, LXIX {Octo- . 
ber, 1972), 567-579, -
Keyt, David. "The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus." The 
?h1losoph1ca.l Review, LXXX (April, 1971), 230-235, 
Lynch, Willi am F. An Approach to the Metapl}_,ysics of 
Plato Throuii,h the 'Par menides'. Washington, George-
town University Press, 1959, 
Moravcsik, J.M. E. "The Concept of Existence and Self-
Exemplification in Plato's Philosophy." Unpublished, 
Standford University. 
Moreau; Joseph. "The Platonic Idea and Its Three Fold 
Function, A-Synthesis." International Philo sophical 
~ -~tetli, IX (December, l9b9)• 477~517. 
Owen, Ge E. L. "Not es on Ryle' s Plato~" ~yle I Modern 
Studies in Philosoph~. Edited by Oscar P, Wood and 
George Pitcher, A Doubleday Anchor Original, Garden 
City, New Yorks Doubleday a:nd Company, Inc., 1970. 
e "The Place of the 'Timae~~• in Plato's 
----DiP..logues.0 Stu.dies in Plato's Met~_l2hysics. Edited 
by R. E. Allen. New York: The Humanities Press, 1965. 
Panagiotous, Spiro. "Vlastos on Parmenides 132Al-B2, Some 
of His ·rext and Logic.,. .~'111os ophical 9ua.rterly, 
XXI {July, 1971), 255-259 • . 
Robinson, Richard. Essays- !n Greek PhU,~ophy, Oxford, 
The Cl a rendon P1-..ess1 1969. 
118 
, and Denniston, J. D. ''Plato." Plato I 1 
-----Metaphysics and Ep:bst _emologz • . •._.,Edited by Gregory 
Vla.stos. Anchor Books. Garden City, New Yorks 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971. 
" Roohol, Hans. "The Dialogue 'Parmenides's An Insoluble 
Enigma in Platonism?" Internation al Philosophical 
_Quarterly, XI (December, 19iiT;-z~96-,520. 
Runciman, Walter Garrison. ]?la.to• s L9;ter~_!:plste~~ogz . 
Ce.mbride, Englands The University Press, 19 2. 
• ..Plato's Par menides. '' Studies in Plato• s 
--- M-e-taphysics . Edited by R~ E.-Alien: New Yorl-c:1 
The Huma.n1t1es Press, 1965. 
Russell, Bertran d. Prtnctples of Mathematicse The Norton 
Library. New Yor1t ~rtonannCompany , Inc c p 
n.d. 
Ryle, Gilbert. · "Plato's Parmentdes." Studies in Plato's 
Meta.physic~. Edited by R. Ee Allen. New Yorks 
The Hume.nities Press, 1965. 
---·~--_. f,~~to s s PEQ.Sress. Cambridge England I The 
University Press , 19675 •. 
Sella rs, Wilfrid. Vlastos and 'The Third Man'. Philo-
Q.Q..2.Q1£~!_E_~sp e~~. S pringllild, Ilff no~ Tnomas·-;-1967 o
Stran g, Col in. 11 Plato and the Th~.rd :Mane u f!ato I, 
~ill?,h,Y,sic~ .. a._nd Ep1~~!110J.,05¥.• Edited by Gre ·gory 
Vla stos. Anchor Books . Garden City, New Yorks 
Doubleday end Company, Inc., 1971. 
,r 
Taran, Leonardo. Parme:nides: A . Text ,211 t-~L'.£~..E~l.!!:t 1on 2 Commentary ,_anci"Critic a l Essa~. Princeto a , New 
Jerseyi Princeton University Press , 1965. 
Taylor, A. Ee Parmeni_~s 2 Zeno , e.nd _S9_cyates, Phtlo-
sophtce.1 St ud ies. Freeport, New York, Books for 
Libraries Press, 1968. 
_____ • Plato 1 Th~!1~ and His Ji£!~• New Yorks The 
Humanities Press , 1949. 
119 
• The 'Parmenides' of Pla..!2• Oxford 1 ·rhe 
C iarendon Press, ~l ~34~~ · -· .l: · 
Turnbull, Robert G. "Platois Repudlation of the 'Separa-
t • f th Forms 1n Parmenideis 127B-135C." 1on o . e __ 
Unpublished. 
Vlastos, Gregory. "Addenda to the Third Man Argument, 
A Reply to Pro:fessor Sellars." The Philosophical 
Re_yj.ew, LXIV {July, 1955), 438-448, 
• "Plato 1 s 'Third Man1 Argument (Par men1d.es 
1J2Al-B2) 1 Text and Logic." Phii~i'°~ ·-
~~~-terlz, XIX {October, 1969), 2~9-JOl. 
• "Postsc:r.t :r.,t to the Third Ma.n.1 A Hoply to 
Mr. Geach. 11 Studies tn Pl a t9 t·s 11,~pl}J..§~• 
Edlt~d by R. E. 0 Allen., New York, The Humanities 
Press 9 1965, 
